Privatization of transit in Yokohama : social and financial impacts by Nakajima, Tsukihito
Privatization of Transit in Yokohama T. Nakajima
Privatization of Transit in Yokohama: Social and Financial Impacts
by
TSUKIHITO NAKAJIMA
B.A., Policy Management
Keio University, 1998
Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning
requirements for the degree of
in partial fulfillment of the
MASTER IN CITY PLANNING
at the
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
June 2007
© 2007 Tsukihito Nakajima.
All rights reserved
The author hereby grants to MIT permission to reproduce and to distribute publicly paper
and electronic copies of this thesis document in whole or in part in any medium now
known or hereafter created.
S ignature of A uthor...................................... . ......
Departm 6n rban Studies and Planning
May 24, 2007
C e rtified by ........................................
Profe
Accepted by..............
. 7 0rcH
..................
J' Nigel H.M. Wilson
ssor of Civil and Environmental Engineering
Thesis Supervisor
......................................... I.............
Langley Keyes
Chairman, MCP Committee
-,
2
Privatization of Transit in Yokohama
Privatization of Transit in Yokohama: Social and Financial Impacts
by Tsukihito Nakajima
Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning on May 25, 2006 in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of Master of City Planning
Abstract
This research examines both social and financial impacts of the privatization of
municipally-owned transit systems from the perspective of a privatizing city and its
citizens by studying the case of Yokohama, Japan's second largest city whose transit
systems are now subject to privatization arguments. First, privatization models are
defined based on two dimensions - degree of privatization and deregulation, which are
frequently commingled and misused. Then, this research examines the social impact on
fare levels, service quality, safety, service provision, and labor condition is analyzed
based on prior privatization cases such as Singapore's MRT system, the UK municipal
bus systems, and Japan National Rails. Third, this research suggests a new framework
and methodology based on the perpetuity valuation for financial impact analysis and
quantifies the financial value of each option from the perspective of the City of Yokohama
and its citizens.
Based on the above analysis, this research concludes that publicly-controlled full
privatization in which government retains regulatory power over a privatized entity after
full privatization is the most effective managerial model among the examined options at
least for the City of Yokohama because this option maximizes the net financial value
(Citizens' Equity Value) for the city, while at the same time minimizing the social risks
potentially caused by privatization. More generally, this research recommends that
government should keep its control over a privatized public transit service even after full
privatization and should not rely much on market mechanism in order to alleviate public
concerns and protect public interest.
Because transit privatization is a hot public policy issue discussed widely among major
municipalities in Japan and in developed nations, this research is expected to provide
evidence and policy guidelines not only for Yokohama but also for other municipalities in
developed nations that own and operate transit systems.
Thesis Supervisor: Nigel H.M. Wilson
Title: Professor of Civil and Environmental Engineering
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Chapter 1: Introduction
This thesis evaluates the social and financial impact of the privatization of
municipally-owned transit in Japan through analyzing the case of Yokohama. Based on
the evaluation and analysis, this research finally develops a recommendation to the City
of Yokohama and designs an effective managerial model for the public transit networks
which can be applied to other municipalities in Japan. Because major cities in Japan
which own and operate public transit networks are in a similar situation and face similar
policy issues, this thesis is expected to provide useful guidance for their privatization
decisions. Furthermore, this research should be useful for policy makers in the field of
public transportation policy in other nations because the privatization of public
transportation is a hot policy topic throughout the world.
1.1 Background
1.1.1 Privatization Trend of Public Transportation
Privatization has been a buzz word since the aggressive implementation of privatization
by Margaret Thatcher in 1980s in the UK. Political leaders in many developed nations
were influenced by her privatization program and imported and applied the scheme in
their countries. Ronald Reagan and his administration aggressively promoted
privatization in the US. Mr. Nakasone, the Prime Minister of Japan at that time and friend
of Thatcher and Regan, was one of the strongest proponents of privatization. In fact, he
privatized three giant public enterprises: Nihon Tobacco, Nippon Telegraph &
Telecommunication, and Japan National Rail.
Public transportation has been one of many public monopoly industries targeted for
privatization in many nations. In the UK, since the Transportation Act of 1981, local bus
networks, British National Rail and finally London Bus have been privatized. In 1987, the
Japanese central government privatized Japan National Rail (JNR), one of the largest
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railway networks in the world, and divided it into seven regional companies. The
Singapore Government corporatized and privatized its globally renowned rapid transit
system, Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) in 2000 by listing its stock on the national stock
market. Furthermore, in Hong Kong even after being retuned to communist China, the
subway system was reborn as Mass Transit Rail Corporation (MTRC) through full
privatization. These are just a few examples of the privatization of public transportation
networks.
Privatization is not a policy topic just at the national level. In some of the nine
Government Ordinance Cities in Japan', the privatization of municipally-owned public
transit systems has recently become a hot policy issue for the following two reasons. First,
the financial deficit of, and capital requirement for, municipally-owned public
transportation has worsened municipal finance. Second, because of huge municipal debt
and its interest obligation, the municipal governments in those cities have begun to seek
privatization opportunities in order to obtain extraordinary capital and to consider the
public transportation network as the largest opportunity in terms of impact. Additionally,
the success of the JNR privatization has encouraged municipal leaders to buy in to the
privatization idea. In fact, the Tokyo Metropolitan Government and the central
government corporatized Teito Rapid Transit Authority (and its network) in 2003 and plan
to privatize it by selling stock to private investors eventually, as in the case of JNR. The
Mayor of Osaka has announced that the city will privatize its subway network, Japan's
second largest, as well as the bus system by 2010.
Similar to the other municipalities, the City of Yokohama has suffered from excessive
municipal debt and huge financial losses of the public transit system for a long time.
Given this situation, the city is now struggling with the decision of whether it should
privatize the transit network in order to leave its problematic operations in private hands
and to obtain cash which can be used to reduce the city's debt obligations.
1 The Prime Mister and his cabinet designate the cities that are treated as legally special administrative districts and
awarded autonomy equivalent to prefectures based on population fiscal and economic conditions, and other factors. At
the end of 2006, there are nine Government Ordinance Cities including Yokohama.
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1.1.2 What is Privatization?
As described above, privatization has been a hot policy issue throughout the world. But,
what is privatization? As Donahue pointed out, privatization is "[a] lamentably imprecise
word" (1989) because this buzz word has been used in different meanings in different
political and economic contexts, country to country. In the US, privatization usually
means contracting-out by which the public sector contracts with a private operator and
lets it run the operation; however, the asset ownership still remains in public hands. In
contrast, in the UK and Japan, privatization usually means that the public sector sells the
combination of assets and the right of operation to private investors, this will be
referenced as full privatization.
In addition, privatization is often confused with deregulation or liberalization. Privatization
and liberalization/deregulation are distinct concepts (Vickers & Yarrow, 1997).
Liberalization is the process in which the public sector removes regulations and makes
the market once monopolized by the public sector open to private companies. However,
in the privatization process, regulations are not necessarily removed. The pubic sector
may retain its regulatory power and control even after full privatization. For example, after
the privatization of Japan National Rail, the central government has continued to impose
stringent regulatory schemes on the post-privatization entities so that, for example, they
cannot change the fare level without approval from the government. Another example is
the London Bus. Transportation for London (TfL) retains its control and regulatory power
as planner, regulator, and tenderer after full privatization so that competition among, and
performance of, private operators are effectively managed. Many arguments opposing
privatization are actually arguments opposing the abandonment of public intervention, i.e.,
deregulation or liberalization, not privatization.
Privatization is the process through which the public sector transfers some of its
operations and/or assets to the private sector. However, whether a government privatizes
only operation rights or also ownership of assets can have totally different outcomes and
T Nakajima
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implications; thus, the privatization model in a given context should be specified in order
to avoid confusion and misunderstanding. As will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2, the
models of privatization can be defined along two dimensions: the degree of privatization
and the degree of regulation. The degree of privatization is how much ownership the
pubic sector relinquishes, while the degree of regulation literally means how much
regulatory power the public sector retains after privatization.
1.1.3 General arguments for and against privatization
The proponents of privatization have emphasized its impact on fiscal and operating
performance. They argue that the private sector can frequently operate a given service or
business more efficiently and cost effectively than the public sector. They often attribute
the inefficiency in the public sector to its bureaucratic nature; the lack of managerial
discipline, skill, the sense of urgency, and competitive pressure. In fact, several studies
demonstrated how financial performance and operating performance was significantly
improved in many cases of privatized public enterprises based on either full privatization
or partial privatization. For instance, Megginson, et al. statistically show that profitability,
real sales (excluding subsidies) and operating efficiency have improved significantly after
privatization, using 118 cases around the world between 1961 and 1995 (2001).
In contrast, the opponents of privatization argue that privatized companies tend to focus
too much on profit and shareholders' interest so that public interest is frequently ignored.
In the context of the privatization of public transportation, the opponents argue that a
privatized company is likely to increase fares, abandon unprofitable routes, and decrease
the quality of service in order to maximize profit. In addition, they argue that a privatized
company is also motivated to lay-off existing workers which are usually the largest
component of operating cost. In sum, the opponents of privatization emphasize social
equity issues and argue that generally privatization is harmful to the social welfare.
However, the arguments from both proponents and opponents are not comprehensive
and contain critical flaws and loose generalizations. Sclar described the "policy debate
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[on privatization] largely has been little more than dueling anecdotes. Those favoring
privatization tell their favorite stories, and those opposed peddle theirs" (2001). One of
the most critical flaws in the pro-privatization argument based on financial and operating
improvement is that its analytical unit is a privatized organization or business. Almost all
analysis on financial and performance improvement focuses only on the improvement in
a given privatized entity or even in individual financial items such as operating cost or
operating profit; they fail to examine the comprehensive financial impact from the
perspectives of governments and citizens who ultimately own privatized public assets.
While whether the privatized company improves its cost performance or profit is
important, measuring the total financial impact on a governmental fiscal condition is much
more important from the perspective of the public. Another flaw is that these proponents
often fail to analyze the non-financial and social influence of privatization. In this sense,
they do not effectively respond to the opponents of privatization.
Likewise, the argument of opponents contains critical imperfections. The opponents fail
to support their argument with solid evidence including comprehensive financial impact
analysis from the public perspective. Although they sometime refute proponents by
presenting analysis that there is no significant difference in financial performance
between private and public operation, they look only at cost performance and fail to look
at the other important financial aspects such as the impact on tax and municipal debt.
Opponents also frequently fail to present evidence that privatization harms the social
welfare and interest. More importantly, the opponents frequently replace the argument of
privatization with that of regulation or other forms of governmental intervention.
Privatization itself does not necessarily mean that a privatized entity is released from the
control or intervention of a public authority. As will be examined in detail in Chapter 2 and
4, even a privatized railway company cannot, for instance, increase fare level unless the
fare regulation is removed. In sum, the opponents of privatization also do not effectively
respond to their counterparts.
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1.2 Research Objective
As described above, the chaotic debate between the proponents and opponents of
privatization has been going on for some time. While many cases of privatization of public
transportation are observable nowadays, there is little research that addresses the
effective managerial model for municipal public transportation. Also, no research, to the
knowledge of the author, provides an analysis examining how privatization affects the
public interest and social welfare related to public transportation and how much financial
value for a city or its citizens privatization can create, comprehensively. As a result, policy
makers or municipal leaders who are struggling with whether they should privatize their
public transportation systems do not have an effective framework or guidelines they can
follow in their privatization decision.
Given this situation, the primary goal of this thesis is therefore to suggest the effective
managerial model for municipal public transit system, which minimizes the social risk and
maximizes the financial impact. More specifically, this thesis first defines the key
managerial models for municipal public transportations, considering the degree of
privatization and governmental intervention. Then, the thesis will examine how social
benefits relating to public transit would be affected by each managerial model.
Incorporating these analyses, this thesis will then examine how much financial value for a
city and its citizens can be created by each model by using the financial data for
Yokohama's public transit networks. Through these analyses, the effective managerial
model will be determined, and recommendations specifically for the City of Yokohama but
also for other Japanese municipalities will be crafted.
Yokohama's public subway and bus systems are selected as the case to be tested
because of the data availability particularly for financial valuation. In addition, Yokohama,
the second largest city in Japan and known as a progressive city whose policy reforms
garner attention from other municipalities, is now facing a privatization decision for its
public transit networks as will described in detail in Chapter 3.
T Nakajima
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1.3 Research Approach
To achieve the objective addressed above, this research adopts the following
methodologies and approaches.
* Quantitative and Qualitative analysis of social influence and governmental
interventions: this thesis will analyze the social influence of public transit privatization
and effective governmental interventions which minimize the social risk, based on
actual cases of privatization, specifically for the rail rapid transit (subway), the cases
of Japan National Rails and SMRT (Singapore Mass Rapid Transit) will be examined.
The case of Japan National Rail is selected to examine the social influence of
privatization and the roles of government intervention in post-privatization within the
same country as the Yokohama case. SMRT is chosen primarily because it is one of
the few cases of subway privatization in the world and because the surrounding
social, economic, and political situations are somewhat similar to Yokohama and
Japan. To examine the social influence of bus privatization, the UK cases (London
and other local bus services) will be examined. Those cases are chosen because the
comparison between London and ex-London local bus services can illuminate the
differences and similarities in the social influence of privatization with different levels
of post-privatization governmental intervention. In addition, among the developed
nations, the social, political, and economic systems in the UK are somewhat similar
to those in Japan so that those cases provide relevant and practical implications to
Yokohama and other Japanese municipalities.
* Financial Valuation from the citizens' perspective: Based on the discounted cash flow
(DCF) method and corporate finance theory, the comprehensive financial impact of
the privatization of municipal public transportation will be examined by comparing the
public ownership (i.e., the continuation of municipal ownership) and the private
ownership models. This research not only analyzes the stand-alone business value
but also incorporates the financial impact on debt obligation, tax and other financial
elements which should be examined to understand the holistic influence on municipal
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fiscal condition or the financial burden on tax payers (citizens). To do this, a new
analytical framework will be introduced, and financial simulation models will be built
and implemented using actual financial data of Yokohama's municipal transportation
businesses. The data from other cases will be used to develop the assumptions for
this simulation. Because of the uncertainty of the assumption for each financial metric
and its sensitivity to the impact, the valuation is conducted with three scenarios
-base, optimistic, and pessimistic. The methodology and data used in the valuation
will be explained in detail in Chapter 5.
1.4 Thesis Organization
This thesis contains the following 5 chapters. In Chapter 2, the privatization models for
municipal public transportation are defined along two dimensions, the degrees of
privatization and governmental intervention (regulation). In Chapter 3, the case of
Yokohama's municipally-owned public transportation networks, bus and subway, and
privatization arguments for them are illustrated. In Chapter 4, the social influence and the
risk of the privatization of public transportation will be discussed and examined based on
actual cases of privatization. The relationship between the social influence and
governmental intervention are also examined. Chapter 5 then introduces the financial
valuation model for the privatization of municipal public transportation. Using this model,
this chapter analyzes the financial value of each managerial model from the city and
citizens' perspective. Chapter 6 then summarizes this research and suggests the
effective managerial model for Yokohama and the expected government intervention or
regulatory control mechanism for the city.
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Chapter 2: Privatization Models
This chapter discusses what privatization means in detail and introduces the privatization
models for municipal public transportation. To begin with, the spectrum of ownership
models is framed by examining the technical options for privatization. Next, the
relationship and differences between privatization and the removal of governmental
control are discussed. Finally, based on these discussions, the privatization models of
municipal public transportation, which will be examined throughout this thesis, are
introduced.
2.1. Spectrum of Privatization
2.1.1. Range of Privatization Options
Although the definition of privatization is the process in which the public sector transfers
some of its operations and/or assets to the private sector, there are many technical
options to implement the process. The Reason Foundation, one of the most aggressive
institutional supporters of privatization, identifies fourteen different technical options
including contracting-out, management contract, franchising, asset-sales, and
Build-Own-Operate (2006). Even in asset-sales, there are many variations such as direct
trade sales, IPO-based privatization, and leveraged buy-out (LBO). Major options
frequently applied in privatization practice are the following:
* Contractinq-out: Government contracts with a private vendor and allows it to provide
public service on its behalf. However, the control over the service standards remains
in the public sector, and service users pay a tariff to government (GAO, 1997). The
private contractor is compensated based on the contract with government. Typically,
a contractor is selected through a competitive bidding process in which the bidder
presenting the lowest cost wins the competition. This is the option which is the most
commonly applied in privatization practice in the US.
. Franchising: Government awards the exclusive operation rights to a single private
firm "within a certain geographical area" (Reason Foundation, 2006) through a
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competitive tendering process. Franchising is similar to contracting-out except that a
private franchisee keeps the service fee/fares paid by customers as its own revenue
while fee or fare level is typically regulated by government (GAO, 1997).
. Market Testing (public-private competition): In this scheme, government treats its
in-house public service organization as one of bidders and allows it to participate in a
bidding process and compete with private bidders (GAO, 1997). This scheme can be
regarded as a process option to implement franchising or contracting-out, although
this scheme differs in that it allows public in-house organizations to participate in the
bidding for operation rights.
* Trade Sales (Direct Asset Sale): The public sector sells its public assets and
operation rights directly to a private investor or company usually via a competitive
bidding process.
" Joint Venture: The public sector and the private sector jointly establish a company
and share the equity of the company. The public sector may provide public assets as
its equity share and let the private sector provide cash for its equity portion so that the
public sector can retain the control and participate in the profit stream of the joint
venture without cash obligation.
" Initial Public Offering: After corporatizing public service operation and assets,
government lists the stocks of the corporation on a public stock market and sells
some, or all, of the stock. This method is frequently used in the privatizations in the
UK and Japan. Because initial public offering incurs significant cost associated with
stock issue and trade (Damodaran, 2003), this scheme is usually applied in relatively
large-scale privatizations such as the privatization of a public telecommunication
monopoly.
* Leveraged Buy Out (LBO): LBO is commonly used in the private sector in acquiring a
company. An acquirer borrows money from banks to buy a target company or
business by using the assets or cash/cash equivalents of the target company as
collateral. In this way, an acquirer can take over a company or business with
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minimum capital from its own account. LBO has variations: Management Buy Out
(MBO) and Employee Buy Out (EBO). In MBO, senior managers of a company
borrow money to buy their company stock (ownership) from existing shareholders
(owners). Likewise, in EBO, a labor union or employee organization borrows money
to acquire the company stock from existing shareholders. In the process of the UK
bus privatization, MBO or EBO were applied in many cases (Spear, 1999).
. Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT): This scheme is applied particularly to infrastructure
-based public service. The private sector finances, constructs, and operates public
infrastructure (Reason Foundation, 2006) such as roads, rail lines, and water stations
based on a contract with the public sector. After the termination of the contract period,
operation rights and asset ownership of the infrastructure are transferred to the public
sector.
* Build-Transfer-Operate (BTO): Similar to BOT, this scheme is applied to public
infrastructure. However, in this scheme, the infrastructure asset ownership is sold to
the public sector immediately after the completion of construction (Reason
Foundation, 2006). The private sector continues the operation of the infrastructure by
paying leasing fees to the public sector.
" Build-Own-Operate (BOO): Although the Reason Foundation defines this scheme as
one of the privatization options (2006), this has nothing to do with privatization in the
sense that the private sector finances, constructs, owns, and operate infrastructure
(i.e., with no public sector involvement) from the beginning to the end.
" Lease-back: In this scheme, the public sector sells its assets to the private sector and
leases the sold assets from the private sector by paying the leasing fee. Note that
operation remains in public hands; only asset ownership is transferred to the private
sector. In this way, the public sector can obtain one-shot sales proceeds which can
be used for other purposes. However, to the author's knowledge, there is no example
of this scheme being applied in the privatization of public transportation. Even in
other areas of privatization, this scheme has rarely been applied except for the
lease-back of governmental office buildings.
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2.1.2 Key elements of Privatization
Although many technical options for privatization exist as exemplified above, they can be
classified into three groups: privatized operation, asset-transfer privatization, and full
privatization (Figure 2-1). Privatized operation is privatization through which the public
sector transfers only the operation rights to the private sector through a contract.
Contracting-out, BOT, and BTO can be classified in this group because asset ownership
in the three options ultimately belongs to the public sector. In other words, only operation
rights are transferred to the private sector in these schemes. Whether franchising
belongs to this group depends on whether a franchisee needs to provide both service
and assets required for a given service by itself. If the public sector provides the required
assets and allows a franchisee to use these publicly-provided assets, such franchising
belongs to the group of privatized operation (operating franchising). However, if a
franchisee owns and provides its assets for a franchised service operation, as in the case
of London Bus, this model belongs to full privatization.
In comparison, asset-transfer privatization refers to the case in which the public sector
transfers only the ownership of public assets. In this sense, only the lease-back scheme
belongs to this category. As mentioned above, this scheme has been rarely applied and
not at all to public transportation, to the knowledge of the author.
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Figure 2-1: TECHNICAL OPTIONS FOR PRIVATIZATION
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Partial
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Privatization-
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Full privatization is the combination of the other models because it is the privatization by
which the public sector transfers not only the rights of operation but also the assets
ownership. Trade sales, IPO, and LBO should be categorized in this group because both
operation rights and asset ownership are transferred to a profit-seeking company and its
private shareholders. Even when a selling government retains some portion of equity of a
privatized organization, as long as operation rights and asset ownership are shifted to a
profit-seeking entity, the process of ownership transfer should be regarded as full
privatization because such an entity is legally regarded as a private entity. In this sense, a
joint venture between the public and private sectors can be seen as one form of full
privatization. As described above, franchising in which a franchisee is expected to
provide not only service operation but also assets required for the operation should also
be counted as full privatization.
Among the above three privatization categories, this thesis focuses on the privatized
operation and the full privatization groups because asset-transfer privatization, i.e.,
lease-back model, does not yet exist in privatization cases of public transportation; the
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lease-back model is seemingly irrelevant to the practical privatization decision in this field.
Comparing the other two privatization categories, the full privatization group, by definition,
has a higher degree of privatization than the privatized operation group in which only
operation rights are shifted to the private sector, and is positioned at the far right in the
diagram below (Figure 2-2). In comparison, the privatized operation group is located in
the center of the diagram.
Figure 2-2: SPECTRUM OF OWNERSHIP MODELS
Degree of Privatization
Status-quo Concession Full Privatization(the continuation (Privatized
of public operation)
ownership)
I I I
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2.2 Governmental Control
Privatization is frequently misinterpreted as deregulation or removal of public control. The
removal of governmental control can be defined as the abandonment of any form of
public control or influence which controls the malpractice of profit-seekers, guides them
to fair and sound competition, and protects the public interest and social welfare. Given
this definition, privatization and the removal of public control are distinct concepts, as
Vickers and Yarrows point out (1997).
Governmental control in a given industry can therefore be retained or even reinforced
after privatization. Indeed, the privatization cases in which government continues to
retain its prior control over an industry to which a company privatized by government
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belongs can often be observed in both the U.K. and Japan. The municipal government
and its transportation authority of London, Transport for London (TfL) fully privatized their
globally renowned bus network in 1993 by selling operation rights and assets to the
companies which used to be the subsidiaries of London Bus Ltd., a public enterprise.
However, TfL did not abandon its role as planner and regulator to manage the
competition among private bidders, service standards, and fare levels. In sum, the
argument by the opponents of privatization that privatization distorts social equity and
allows profit-seeking companies to behave free of governmental intervention is not
necessarily true; it depends on decisions about the degree of retention of government
control.
2.2.1 Governmental Control for a Rail Network
Governmental control or intervention is often desired to protect the public interest and to
alleviate the public concerns about infrastructure companies such as railway companies
which can be seen to have a natural monopolistic nature. The huge capital investment
required for the construction of infrastructure would discourage potential competitors
from entering the market and competing with an incumbent (Vickers and Yarrow, 1997,
Gomez-Ibanez, 2003). Another important feature of infrastructure companies is, as
Gomez-Ibanez points out, "immobility" (2003). Once infrastructure is constructed, it
cannot easily be removed so that its provider cannot exit from the market. In other words,
the infrastructure itself would become the exit barrier for an infrastructure company. This
exit barrier discourages new entries because it is risky to commit to such a capital
intensive and hard-to-exit business. Customers or residents in an area served by the
provider are also immobile (Gomez-Ibanez, 2003); they cannot easily move out of the
area to seek better infrastructure provision simply because it is costly for them to do so.
Therefore, customers often have little choice or availability of substitutes. Because of
huge capital investment and inflexibility, an infrastructure company tends to be a natural
monopoly. In the context of public transportation, this argument is particularly true for a
railway business.
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Traditional regulators argue that a natural monopoly causes allocative inefficiency - the
inefficiency in social resource allocation. A monopolist would seek "monopoly profit"
which can be generated by providing services or products with prices set unfairly beyond
marginal cost (Vickers and Yarrow, 1997). A monopolist can set such prices due to the
lack of competition (i.e., customers have no choice but to keep paying even unfairly high
prices). In this way, the income transfer from customers to a monopolist occurs via unfair
prices.
Another issue of a natural monopoly is internal inefficiency or "X-inefficiency"
(Leibenstein, 1966). X-inefficiency is organizational inefficiency caused by lack of
managerial discipline mainly due to the absence of competitive pressure from outside the
organization; managers in a monopoly do not have a real incentive to improve their
company's efficiency. Empirical studies show that the impact on the entire national
economy from X-inefficiency is much larger and more problematic than that from
allocative inefficiency at least in the capitalist developed nations (Leibenstein, 1966).
Because a monopolist understands that an excessive monopoly profit pool (allocative
inefficiency) invites further governmental intervention or cuts in subsidies, an
infrastructure company voluntarily curbs its own monopolistic tendencies and hesitates to
charge unfairly high prices; thus, allocative inefficiency due to a natural monopoly would
be limited.
Government can correct inefficiency caused by a natural monopoly through a variety of
form of intervention. First, government can take over such a natural monopoly and
provide service directly to citizens so that government can prevent monopoly profit (i.e.,
allocative inefficiency). This is only effective when X-inefficiency is less important than the
efficiency gained from the economies of scale because there is still no competition which
can alleviate X-inefficiency. Second, in order to alleviate the allocative inefficiency,
government can control prices and service standards of an infrastructure company via
regulation or contract with the company without taking it over. This approach can be
effective in the same way as the publicly-owned approach. However, this approach may
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be able to reduce not only allocative inefficiency but also X-inefficiency by introducing
quasi-competition such as yardstick competition or competition for franchising. Finally, a
government can promote new entries and spur competition by removing entry and exit
barriers. Nevertheless, this approach can be adopted only when the allocative
inefficiency or X-inefficiency is more important than the efficiency from the economies of
scale. It is also important to note that competition is not always an ideal situation
particularly for infrastructure-based industries. It is sometime socially inefficient and
costly to allow multiple companies to duplicate similar infrastructure in a given
geographical market for the sake of competition (Vickers and Yarrow, 1997). In addition,
each company in a competitive setting is more likely to focus on profit-maximization by
abandoning unprofitable service lines which might be important to society.
2.2.2 Governmental Control for a Bus System
Unlike rail infrastructure such as subway networks, bus networks are relatively flexible.
First, a bus system does not require as large initial investments as a subway network.
Second, bus routes can be changed over time simply because routes are not fixed or
dedicated only for a bus system (they can be shared with other transport modes). Third,
multiple operators can operate within a single network because one route within the
network is largely independent from other routes. Fourth, the efficiency gained of the
economies of scale for a bus system is limited (Cowie and Asenova, 1999). Therefore, a
bus system does not have the natural monopolistic nature of a subway network and
seems more suitable for market competition at first glance.
Then, why does local government directly own and operate public bus networks in so
many municipalities throughout the world? The traditional rationale behind the public
provision of bus services is that bus is a minimum and universal form of transportation for
all citizens, particularly those who cannot use private alternatives. Indeed, competition
among private operators does not guarantee the provision of unprofitable but socially
necessary routes because profit-seeking operators are likely to exit from unprofitable
routes. Some routes are profitable only for a single operator and do not allow additional
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players to enter due to limited profitability. In such a case, an incumbent operator could
leverage its monopolistic power if government would not prevent such monopolistic
behavior through regulation. In addition, safety, congestion, and other social issues
related to bus service provision would not necessarily be solved by market competition
among private bus operators. In sum, a market mechanism alone does not necessarily
serve all social needs (i.e., market failure). This is perhaps why many municipalities
provide bus service directly.
However, like a natural monopoly, public provision of bus service is more likely to cause
X-inefficiency. Because the public sector does not have to be concerned about
profitability, the operation by the public sector tends to be economically inefficient by
nature. Bureaucracy deeply rooted in public organizations aggravates economic
inefficiency. Because of the lack of economic incentives, public bus operators tend to be
less responsive to customers' voice or to the potential for innovation. As a result, service
standards and quality of public bus services tend to be lower than those of private
counterparts.
2.2.3 Spectrum of Government Control
In sum, a government should determine the appropriate level of control between public
ownership and free competition (i.e., zero intervention), considering the trade-off
between allocative inefficiency/X-inefficiency and the efficiency gained from the
economies of scale, particularly in the subway case, or alleviation of market failure in the
bus case (Figure 2-3). Ideally, a government needs to come up with a balanced solution
which can alleviate allocative and X-inefficiency, while at the same time retaining the
benefits of the economies of scale or the alleviation of market failure. It is also important
to note that because this balanced solution can be introduced only by government,
governmental control is important in designing an effective managerial model.
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Figure 2-3: SPECTRUM OF GOVERNMENTAL CONTROL
Degree of Deregulation
Public
Ownership
Governmental
Control
Free Competition
I
- Public Authority
- Public Enterprise
I
' Regulations
" Control via Contract
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2.3 Privatization Models for public transportation
Figure 2-4 presents a matrix that combines the degree of privatization and
market-orientation discussed above. Three privatization models are identified: (1)
concession, (2) publicly-controlled full privatization, and (3) market-oriented full
privatization. The bottom left cell is empty because any model in which ownership
belongs to government, even partially, cannot escape government control. Therefore,
logically and practically, only the three models identified in the matrix can exist.
Technical
Options
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Figure 2-4: PRIVATIZATION MODELS
Public Degree of Privatization Full
Ownership Privatization
Status-quo LwHg
Low (1) Concession (2)Pubicly-controlledFull Privatization
0
H igh Logically Null Set
Free
Competition
(1) Concession: In this model, only operation rights are transferred from a government
to a private operator, and asset ownership is publicly-retained. By definition, the degree
of market-orientation is low because a government influences or controls a private
operator's behavior through asset ownership and contract. Examples of this model are
SMRT and most privatization cases in the US. Although SMRT is an independent
stock-listed corporation, its rail network is leased from the Singapore Government on a
30-year term. SMRT needs to follow strict approval procedures and use a price-setting
formula determined by the government although SMRT retains fare collected from
customers as its revenue based on the franchising contract. The service standards in
terms of quality and quantity are also provided by the government which monitors the
operation of SMRT. In municipal bus privatization cases in the US, a municipal
government typically contracts with a private bus operator only for operation based on
predetermined service standards and prices. The operator's revenue is usually a contract
fee based on a cost-plus scheme, not the fare-box revenue collected directly from
passengers. Government carefully monitors the operator's performance and replaces an
underperforming operator with a new operator by not extending the contract. In this way,
a municipal government can control the private contractor's performance, although it is
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sometimes difficult for a municipal government to monitor and control an operator
perfectly as many cases exemplify.
(2) Publicly-controlled full privatization: Although both asset ownership and operation
rights of publicly-provided transportation are transferred to the private sector, government
is deeply involved with fare setting and/or service planning via either regulation or other
means in this model. In addition, government typically controls the competition itself by
managing the number of entrants or forms of competition by applying a public tendering
process or simple entry regulation. The key feature of this model is that the dual benefits
of competition and public control can co-exist. As a result, allocative inefficiency and
X-inefficiency can be alleviated while at the same time economies of scale can be
retained.
Typical cases of this model are the privatization of Japan National Railway and London
Bus. In 1987, Japan National Rail was privatized and divided into six regional companies.
Among the six companies, Japan Rail (JR) East, JR West, and JR Central listed their
company stock in the major stock exchanges in Japan and have since operated
essentially without subsidies from the central government. All of the residual debts as of
1987 were also assigned to those three companies because they cover advantageous
regions. The other three companies, JR Hokkaido, JR Kyushu, and JR Shikoku, cover
three islands which are rural regions with low population density and thus retain financial
support from the central government. As already mentioned, the central government has
controlled, in particular, fare levels and safety standards rigorously through regulation in
Japan. As will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4, the fare level of all railway and bus
transportation systems are determined based on a yardstick competition approach by the
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport (MOLIT). Thus, even after full privatization
(IPO), JR East and other privatized regional companies cannot change fare levels freely.
Similarly, post-privatization London bus companies are heavily controlled by TfL. By 1993,
all subsidiaries of London Bus Ltd., a public enterprise that owned and operated London
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Bus, were fully privatized (Rye and Wilson, 2002); the assets were sold to succeeding
private companies. The operation rights for each bus route is awarded to a private
company which offers the lowest contract price for given service standards stipulated by
TfL in a competitive tendering process (Lawton-Smith, 1995). In this way, TfL retains full
control over planning, scheduling, and fares (Rye and Wilson, 2002) and introduces
managed competition through a competitive tendering process.
(3) Market-oriented full privatization: In this model, government not only transfers both
asset ownership and operation rights to the private sector but also greatly relinquishes its
control and influence by removing regulation and permitting competition. The underlying
principle in this model is that sound market competition should restrain a privatized
company and encourage it to improve efficiency.
Privatization of the UK local bus services outside London is an example of this model.
Based on the transportation act of 1985, deregulation and privatization of bus operation
occurred throughout the UK except London (the privatization of London Bus occurred in
1994). As a result of deregulation, market entry was liberalized based on the
Transportation Act of 1985 (Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer, 1990, Rye and Wilson, 2002); any
private operator could begin operation 42 days after registration. Unlike the privatization
of London Bus, the UK government allowed free competition among local bus operators
based on the belief that sound market competition alone would lead to better cost
efficiency and improve services at optimal fare levels (Rye and Wilson, 2002). Although
on-the-street competition did not always occur after privatization, a potential threat of new
entries due to the removal of regulatory entry barriers and relatively small upfront
investment provided sufficient pressure on an incumbent to improve performance
(Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer, 1990 and 1993). As a result, approximately 80% to 85% of
local bus routes are operated on a commercial basis (without subsidies) (Lawton-Smith,
1995, Rye and Wilson, 2002). Local bus authorities were privatized by selling their assets
to private investors, to an existing management team (i.e., MBO), or to a labor union (i.e.,
EBO). Relatively small operators which could not compete effectively were gradually
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acquired by larger companies. Through merger and acquisition, the top five bus
operating companies controlled 52% of the local bus service market in the UK as of 1997
(Cowie and Asenova, 1999).
2.4 Concluding remarks
In addition to the status quo (i.e., the continuation of current public ownership), the three
privatization models, concession, publicly controlled full privatization, and
market-oriented full privatization, should be examined in choosing an effective
management model for a given public transportation service and network. In selecting to
one model, a decision-maker should examine the social, operational and financial
impacts of each model and compare the impacts of one model versus others as this
thesis will do in the following chapters. Before the comparative analysis of the three
privatization models and the status-quo are discussed, the basic profile of and the
privatization argument for Yokohama's transit networks will be introduced in the next
chapter.
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Chapter 3: Privatization Argument in Yokohama
This chapter introduces the case of the municipally-owned public subway and bus
systems in Yokohama, with an illustration of the privatization debates in the city. First, to
provide the context for the debate, the reform introduced by the young mayor of
Yokohama is briefly described. Then a brief description of the municipal transit systems in
Japan is presented, and the basic profile of Yokohama's transit networks is introduced.
Finally, the privatization debate in Yokohama is summarized and analyzed.
3.1 Nakada's Reform
In 2002, the citizens of Yokohama, the second largest city in Japan in terms of population
(3.5 million), celebrated the election of the youngest mayor in Japanese history. Mr.
Hiroshi Nakada who became the mayor of the City of Yokohama when he was thirty-eight
years old had previously been a congressman in the Diet and had abundant political
experience for his age. The majority of citizens voted for him as their mayor because they
had been concerned about the poor prospects for their city and because their mistrust of
traditional politics had reached a peak.
Mr. Nakada did not betray the trust of his supporters. Immediately after he took office, he
launched several programs to reform the inefficient municipal bureaucracy by introducing
managerial methods commonly used in the private sector, to improve the city's disastrous
finances by eliminating unproductive public works, and to provide citizen-oriented public
services. He halted the downward trend of municipal tax revenue and kept the amount of
municipal bonds issued low (Figure 3-1& 3-2).
Furthermore, based on his fundamental belief that government should involve the private
sector in fields where it can provide service more productively than the public sector, Mr.
Nakada has leveraged the private sector and let it take over some public services which
used to be provided by the city. Among the public services Mr. Nakada has targeted, the
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two public transportation networks are the largest ones in terms of their size and social
and financial impact.
Figure 3-1: YOKOHAMA MUNICIPAL TAX REVENUE
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Figure 3-2: YOKOHAMA MUNICIPAL BONDS ISSUED
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3.2 Municipal Public Transportation in Japan
It is quite common for the municipal governments of the major cities in Japan to own and
operate public mass transit networks. Currently, the nine government ordinance cities2
including Yokohama provide mass rapid transit (subway) and bus services.
Metropolitan transit networks play a significant role in urban development in Japan.
Considering the extremely high population densities particularly in the metropolitan areas,
congestion is one of the largest policy issues for Japanese metropolitan municipalities.
Workers who live in suburban areas generally prefer to use public transportation in
commuting to their work places even though they usually own a car, because public
transportation is more reliable than driving a car given the risk of being stuck in traffic.
Many residents even with relatively high income who live near the city center do not even
own a car because owning and using a car is expensive (renting a parking space is
extremely costly because of the scarcity of land). This is why public transportation has
maintained such a high transportation mode share (Figure 3-3). In sum, public
transportation including bus and rail plays a more significant role than in other developed
nations such as the US. And, thanks to this significant position of public transportation,
both subway and bus systems in Japan can keep high fare-box operating and fare-box
recovery ratios compared with other nations (Figure 3-4 and 3-5).
2 Treated equivalent to prefectures
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Figure 3-3: BREAKDOWN OF TRANSPORATION MODE IN JAPAN
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Figure 3-4: FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF MAJOR SUBWAY
NETWORKS IN THE WORLD
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Figure 3-5: FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF
MAJOR BUS NETWORKS IN THE WORLD
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Urban rail networks between the suburbs and the city center have been well-developed
by the private sector in Japan. In contrast, the underground rail networks in large
metropolitan areas have to date been developed and operated by the public sector. This
is largely because the construction of a subway system requires major investment which
is usually beyond the financial capacity of private investors. They simply cannot endure
financial loss over a long period caused by the huge burden of depreciation and debt
obligation. Without manipulating fare levels, private investors cannot meet their targeted
rate of return. Furthermore, subway systems have been the only practical way to
transport the large number of commuters in major cities with limited land without
destroying the existing dense and complex metropolitan landscape.
Similar to the subway system, metropolitan bus networks in the major cities have been
developed by the public sector, although it is difficult to find strong financial reasons for
public involvement in bus operation. In fact, there are many cases in which private bus
operators provide transit service in many small and medium size cities in Japan. In
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addition, many private bus operators which are usually subsidiaries of private railway
companies have recently entered into the metropolitan bus markets and compete with
existing municipally-provided bus service.
The arguments for and against privatization of these metropolitan public transit networks
have been made in almost all major cities and indeed have become intense, of late. One
of the major arguments is that public authorities are less efficient and disciplined than
private operators. Consequently, the municipally-owned transit operation incurs financial
deficits which lead to increases in the tax burden of citizens. Another and perhaps more
important (hidden) motivation of the privatization is heavy municipal debt. Because the
major cities are struggling to pay back their mammoth debt and the associated interest,
policy-makers could find an effective source of capital which can be used for debt
repayment if they could sell the large transit networks which themselves have been one
of the major sources of the giant debt. Indeed, The Tokyo Metropolitan Government and
the central government corporatized the subway network which used to be owned and
operated by the Teito Rapid Transit Authority and established Tokyo Metro Co. Ltd. in
2003. Although the two governments still retain all equity of Tokyo Metro, they plan to sell
shares to private investors gradually and to privatize the company fully in 2009, in order
to obtain sales proceeds.
3.3 Municipal Transportation Systems in Yokohama
3.3.1 Yokohama Municipal Subway Network
Yokohama Municipal Subway Network (YMSN) began operations in 1972. The network is
relatively small compared with the major global subway systems in terms of the number
of annual passengers (Figure 3-6). The annual ridership is 164 million in 2005, which has
grown steadily since 1980 (a compounded annual growth rate of 5.42%), although the
number has been far below the initial demand prediction3 (Figure 3-7). The length of the
system is 40.4 km with two lines (Ichigo-sen and Sango-sen) which form one long
3 It is frequently observed that officials and planners in Japan present too optimistic demand prediction in order to
approval for the construction of public infrastructure or operating license.
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linear-shaped network (Figure 3-8). As of 2005, there are 32 stations and 228 rail cars.
Although the ridership as well as operating revenue from the fare-box and advertising
fees have increased steadily, it took 30 years to make its first positive operating profit. In
fiscal year 2002, YMSN earned an operating profit of 1.8 billion yen, and it has remained
in the black since then. Because of the nature of infrastructure business, huge
depreciation cost has squeezed the operating profits of YMSN. However, more
importantly, YMSN's lower cost efficiency, particularly its high wage level, compared with
its private counterparts, is another important factor contributing to the slow take-off.
Figure 3-6: ANNUAL RIDERSHIP OF MAJOR SUBWAY NETWORKS IN
THE WORLD
(Million Passengers:2005)
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1,449
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164
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The sum of the annual ridership of Tokyo Metro Co. Ltd. And Toei Subway (Tokyo Municipal Subway)
Source: Yokohama Statistics Portal, Tokyo Metropolitan Government, TfL: Tube Facts, MTA NYC
Transit, SMRT:Annual Report 2005, T.Nakajima Analysis
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Figure 3-7: PASSENGERS PER DAY - FORECAST vs. ACTUAL
Actual
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Source: The Report from the Ad-hoc Committee of Yokohama Public Transportation (2003)
Figure 3-8: LENGTH OF MUNICIPAL SUBWAY NETWORKS IN JAPAN
(Km:2005)
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Source: The City of Yokohama & Ad-hoc Committee of Public Transportation (2003), T.Nakajima
Analysis
Unlike the operating profit, net profit has remained negative since the start of service. In
FY 2005, the net loss of YMSN was 5.1 billion yen (Figure 3-9). This continuously
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negative net profit is attributed primarily to the huge interest payment on the debt
accumulated in YMSN. For debt interest obligation alone, YMSN spent approximately
15.6 billion yen in 2005. Because subsidiary or financial support from the city and other
public sources are already reflected in net profit, the loss needs to be covered by
additional debt. And, this additional debt incurs further interest obligation which further
squeezes net income. To stop this vicious cycle, the city is looking for a creative solution.
Figure 3-9: OPERATING PROFIT VS. NET INCOME - YMSN
(billion JPY*) Operating Profit*
Net Income**
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
3,41 4,138
2,114
-1,3 
-70
1 - 5,121
I c::: I- 
6,989
- 8,500
- 13,987
- 16,352
-18,179
Operating profit= (Fare-box revenue + Advertising Fee) - (Labor cost + Adm. & Misc. cost + Depreciation)
** Net Income = Operating Profit + Subsidy - Interest - Extraordinary
Source: Yokohama Transportation Bureau: Financial Reports (2005 & 2006), T. Nakajima Analysis
The city is now constructing the third line (Yongo-sen) which is expected to be open in
2008. The construction of this new line has been controversial. First, this construction
has drastically increased the capital burden of the city which already suffers from
snowballing municipal debt obligations. Second, high demand on this new expensive
subway line cannot be expected because of the relatively low population density around
the line and because of competition from private railway companies. Third, the actual
construction cost has far exceeded the original budget (Ad-hoc Committee, 2003).
Furthermore, this line is designed to be powered by a linear induction motor system,
which is different from the third rail electric system used on the two existing lines, so that
rolling stock used on the existing lines cannot run onto the new line and vice versa (i.e.,
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economies of scale are not easily realized between the existing lines and new line).
3.3.2 Yokohama Municipal Bus Service
The bus network provided by the City of Yokohama is much smaller than major municipal
bus services around the world in terms of the number of annual passengers (Figure 3-10).
In FY2005, the ridership of Yokohama Municipal Bus Service (YMBS) was 153 million,
while that of London Bus, the world's largest urban bus network, was 1,816 million.
YMBS' ridership has been unimpressive since 1992, the peak ridership in its history, in
spite of aggressive efforts to expand the system by adding more bus stops and routes
(Figure 3-11). As of 2005, the number of bus stops, routes, and vehicles of YMBS are
1,373, 156, and 1,008, respectively.
Figure 3-10: ANNUAL RIDERSHIP OF BUS NETWORKS IN THE WORLD
(Million Passengers:2005)
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208
Yokohama Tokyo New York London Singapore
Municipal MTA Bus Bus
Bus Service
Source: Yokohama Statistics Portal, Tokyo Metropolitan Government, TfL: Annual Report 2005,
MTA NYC Transit, SMRT:Annual Report 2005, T.Nakajima Analysis
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Figure 3-11:GROWTH OF YOKOHAMA BUS NETWORK
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Source: The City of Yokohama: Yokohama Statistics Portal, T. Nakajima Analysis
Because approximately 40% of YMBS' bus routes operate at an operating deficit4 , the
city and Yokohama Transportation Bureau (YTB) are now reviewing the operation plans
for these lines and considering restructuring. The city and YTB transferred the operating
rights for 9 routes to private bus operators, former competitors, at the end of 2006 at no
cost. YTB also plans to abandon an additional 30 unprofitable routes, most of which can
be substituted by adjacent routes in 2007 .
Similar to the recent unimpressive ridership growth, the financial performance of YMBS
has also been problematic. Both fare-box revenue and advertising revenue have been
decreasing, at the same time that operating cost has been reduced. As a result,
operating profit still remains negative. In FY2005, operating revenue, operating cost, and
operating income are 26, 27.4, and -1.4 billion yen, respectively. In comparison, net
income has usually been positive since 2001 due to subsidies from the city and other
Based on the interview with the city's officials and data provided in January , 2007
YTB proposed "the 15-minute-walk accessibility rule" in which a bus stop is abandoned if there are more than two
stops or railway stations within 15 minute-walk from the stop.
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public sources while net income in 2005 is -140 million yen because of 983 million yen of
extraordinary cost (Figure 3-12).
Figure 3-12: OPERATING PROFIT VS. NET INCOME - YMBS
(billion JPY*) _1 Net Income*
Operating Profit*
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
1,749 1,754
423
71 
-,0 4
- 1,602 -140 -1,624
- 2,239
-3,210
-3,989
Operating profit= (Fare-box revenue + Advertising Fee) - (Labor cost + Adm. & Misc. cost + Depreciation)
** Net Income = Operating Profit + Subsidy - Interest - Extraordinary
Source: Yokohama Transportation Bureau: Financial Report (2006), T. Nakajima Analysis
There is another outstanding issue for YMBS, other than problematic operating
performance. As already mentioned, seven private bus operators operate in the city
principally on the periphery with lower population density and hence lower demand. They
are interested in operating in the center of the city, which is now monopolized by YMBS.
Furthermore, some YMBS routes have extended into the areas served by private
operators and are now competing with private routes. As a result, the private operators
lost 15.9 million passengers between 1997 and 2001 (Figure 3-13).
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Figure 3-13: LEAKAGE OF RIDERSHIP IN PRIVATE BUS OPERATORS
(Million Passengers)
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Natural attrition caused by the shrinking market size itself: Between 1997 and 2001, market decreased by 7%
Equivalent to the difference between the potential ridership after natural attrition and actual ridership in 2001
Source: Yokohama Statistics Report, The Ad-hoc Committee of Public Transportation (2004),
T.Nakajima Analysis
3.4 Privatization Arguments in Yokohama
3.4.1 Birth of the Ad-hoc Committee
On March 13, 2003, The Ad-hoc Committee of Public Transportation (The Ad-hoc
Committee) was organized by Mr. Nakada, and launched a series of discussions. The
Ad-hoc Committee consisted of five members of a various backgrounds including
railways, privatization consultant, accountant, and scholar. The chairman of the
committee was the president of JR East, the largest railway operator formed from Japan
National Railways in 1987 through the IPO-based privatization. The fact that most of the
committee members were appointed directly by the mayor implies that this ad-hoc
committee was given high priority (In Japanese municipalities, members of an ad-hoc
committee are usually recommended by government officials and approved by a mayor).
The primary objective of the Mayor's Ad-hoc Committee was to examine alternatives and
propose an effective managerial option for the two municipally-owned public
transportation networks, subway and bus, which are now owned and operated by
Yokohama Transportation Bureau (YTB). Three main factors motivated the mayor to set
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up the Ad-hoc committee:
1. The fiscal performance of the two networks had not significantly improved as the
mayor had expected. The bus system continued to generate operating losses so that
it could not be run without substantial subsidies from the City of Yokohama. Although
the subway network generated operating profit6, it did not show positive net income 7
because of the huge interest payment on the accumulated debt issued for the past
construction and additional rail line expansion.
2. The productivity of the city's two networks fell far below the average productivity of the
private public transit operators running in and around the city. For example,
passenger kilometer per train-driver of the subway is 53% below the average for three
private railway operators (Figure 3-14). Operating cost per kilometer of the city's bus
operation is 20 % higher than the average for the seven private bus operators
operating in and around the city (Figure 3-15).
3. The city could not continue to fund the financial deficit and support the debt of the city's
public transportation networks because the entire city's fiscal condition had been
worsening at the same time. Mainly because of the significant decrease in municipal tax
revenue caused by the long economic downturn and declining population, the annual
revenue of the city had worsened before Mr. Nakada became mayor. Furthermore,
although Mr. Nakada has struggled to control the amount of bonds issued annually, the
accumulated municipal debt had not been reduced (Figure 3-16). Given this financial
constraint, the city was unlikely to continue to support its problematic public
transportation systems.
6 (Fare-box Revenue + Advertising Revenue) - (Labor cost + Administrative Cost + Depreciation)
7 Operating profit + (Subsidies etc.) - (Interest payment)
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Figure 3-14: PRODUCTIVITY OF RAIL OPERATORS
(Annual Passenger-Km per driver)
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Source: The Report from the Ad-hoc Committee of Yokohama Public Transportation (2003)
Figure 3-15: COST PRODUCTIVITY - YMBS VS. PRIVATE BUS
OPERATORS
(JPY: Operating Cost per Operating Km:2002)
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Figure 3-16: YOKOHAMA RESIDUAL MUNICIPAL DEBT
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3.4.2 Ad-hoc Committee's Findings
The Ad-hoc Committee submitted the final report for the subway network in September,
2003 and that for the bus network in January, 2004. In both reports, the Ad-hoc
Committee proposed full privatization of Yokohama's public transit networks. The full
privatization suggested by the Ad-hoc Committee is privatization based on an Initial
Public Offering (IPO). Namely, the city would corporatize the two public transit networks
and ultimately sell their stock to private investors.
The Ad-hoc Committee's Report concluded that YTB alone cannot generate positive
profit and settle the enormous accumulated deficits for the two network operations
because YTB lacks sufficient managerial discipline, managerial freedom, and competitive
pressure due to its bureaucratic nature. With respect to the bus operation, to produce
positive operating profit, YTB had to improve its productivity by aggressively reducing its
operating cost, in particular labor cost, to the level of its private counterparts. However,
the committee believed that YTB was incapable of taking such a drastic reform both
because YTB lacked the required managerial discipline and skill, and because YTB was
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unlikely to be unwilling to risk damaging itself and its employees voluntarily.
The committee also argued that YTB's internal reform alone, even if successful, could not
settle the accumulated debt, particularly for the subway network. This mammoth debt
incurs a huge annual interest payment which causes constant net loss. To fill the deficit,
the city would then need to issue additional bonds. To stop this vicious cycle of
snowballing debt, the city would need to find a source of funding the debt obligation. This
is probably the primary reason why the Ad-hoc Committee chose IPO-based privatization
through which the city could obtain proceeds from private investors by selling the stock of
privatized entities. However, the committee's logic in choosing this option was not clearly
stated in the reports.
The additional point the committee made is that the city has no reason to keep providing
the two public transit services because private bus and railway companies operate in and
around the city and because they have positive operating profit from their transportation
business alone. The committee pointed out that, in principle, government intervention is
appropriate only when the private sector cannot provide socially necessary services such
as universal transportation service. There are seven private bus operators in Yokohama
and four private railways companies. In such a situation, if the city government continues
to keep providing pubic transit service, sound market and competition among private
companies would be seriously damaged. Indeed, the city bus operation has an
advantage over the private operations in the sense that the city's bus lines usually locate
in the areas with high population and business density. In addition, the committee noted
that several bus lines compete directly with private bus lines.
3.4.3 Critique of the Ad-hoc Committee Reports
Based on the above analytical arguments, the committee concluded that the city should
privatize its public transit networks. However, there are several flaws in the reports. First,
as already mentioned, the reports did not present a clear logic or rationale for choosing
the IPO-based privatization. The committee seemed to consider only two options for the
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bus system: the IPO-based privatization and direct asset-sales to one or more private
operators. It is not clearly stated why the committee considered only these two similar
options (both options are essentially same in that they are full or asset-transfer
privatization) or why the committee chose the preferred option. For the subway network,
the report presented only one option, which is again the IPO-based privatization. In sum,
there is a feeling that the Ad-hoc Committee's arguments and reports were based on the
pre-determined assumption of full privatization from the beginning.
Second, the discussion and the two reports by the committee do not seriously assess
non-financial aspects of public transportation, particularly the public interest including the
influence on fare levels or the treatment of unprofitable but socially necessary lines. The
committee judged that public operation and ownership are inferior to those of the private
sector simply by comparing productivity and financial results. The city's bus operation
might save unprofitable but socially necessary lines which the private operators are
reluctant to save. Without considering the public interest and by directly comparing
productivity or financial figures, the conclusion that the city should fully privatize the
public transit system sounds like a leap of logic based on a superficial argument.
Finally, the two reports did not even present the fiscal impact of the IPO-based
privatization that the committee proposed while the reports did include the profit-loss
scenario of the status-quo. Without presenting the valuation of the proposed option, the
conclusion that the city should fully privatize its public transit networks is not cogent.
Without the evidence, how could Mr. Nakada and the citizens of Yokohama make a
decision whether to go with the proposed option? It should have been the responsibility
of the committee to analyze and present how much the proposed option could improve
the city's fiscal condition and ultimately contribute to the citizens' welfare.
3.4.4 Counter Proposal from Yokohama Transportation Bureau
As the official response to the Ad-hoc Committee Reports, Yokohama Transportation
Bureau (YTB) developed reform plans for the subway and bus network. Basically what
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YTB proposed is a simple extension of the status-quo in which YTB continues to own and
operate the bus and subway networks although YTB insisted that it could improve the
performance of the two public transit systems more aggressively than before.
Subway: YTB's proposal for the subway reform implied that YTB did not accept the
IPO-based privatization suggested by the committee. Although YTB promised that it will
make the final decision on whether to take the option of the IPO-based privatization in the
future, YTB did not clearly state when it would make the decision. In this way, YTB
intended to leave this decision date unspecified.
In addition to the IPO-based privatization recommended by the Ad-hoc Committee, YTB
considered three additional options: the improved public enterprise model (i.e., the
simple extension of the status-quo), the independent administrative institution model, and
the vertical separation model.
Dokuritsu-Gyosei-Houjin, an independent administrative institution, is one type of the
legal public entity in Japan. A government can establish an institution for the service
domain which does not necessarily require direct governmental provision of service, but
which the private sector is unwillingly to provide. However, given the fact that four private
railway companies already operate in and around Yokohama, this option was irrelevant
from the beginning.
Vertical separation is one form of infrastructure privatization that separates operation
from rail network (infrastructure). In this form, the public sector typically continues to own
the rail network, and a private company is awarded the right of operation over the
infrastructure. However, the comparison between the vertical separation which talks
about the form of asset ownership and the other three options which talk about the type
of entity is problematic because they are not mutually exclusive.
Bus: Similar to the subway network, YTB's counter-proposal did not follow the Ad-hoc
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Committee's recommendations. However, unlike the proposal for the subway network,
the counter-proposal for the bus system stated that YTB would make a decision in 2007
on which of three options, including the IPO, YTB will finally adopt. The difference in the
clearness of timing between bus and subway may come from the different degree of
confidence in the internal reform between the two networks. Namely, YTB would have
more confidence in performance improvement in the bus operation because performance
issues of the bus network were basically operational in the sense that the bus operation
did not have the high level of debt that the subway operation had.
YTB considered three options: IPO-based privatization, direct asset sales, and improved
public enterprise. However, the direct-asset sale to private investor(s) is essentially the
same as the IPO-based privatization in the sense that both options transfer the public
assets and the right of operation to private hands (i.e., the transition of the ownership of
business).
3.4.5 Critique of the counter-proposal from Yokohama Transportation Bureau
As with the reports from the Ad-hoc Committee, there are several flaws in the
counterproposal from Yokohama Transportation Bureau (YTB). First, the options
considered by YTB are not comprehensive. YTB failed to present the reason or logic for
considering specific options and excluding other options such as contracting-out.
Second, as already mentioned, the options presented by YTB are also not mutually
exclusive; YTB compared the options of asset-ownership with those of the form of entity.
For instance, vertical separation of the subway system can coexist with the IPO-based
privatization.
Third, similar to the Ad-hoc Committee, YTB failed to present a clear rationale for choice
among the options, although it presented a brief discussion of the advantages and
disadvantages of each option and the estimate of additional cost required for each option.
Because the additional cost is just a small part of the total value, it alone does not provide
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a credible criterion for choice among the options. Thus, the comprehensive financial
value created by each option should have been estimated and compared with other
options.
Fourth, similar to the Ad-hoc Committee, YTB's counterproposal did not analyze any
aspect of public interest. YTB simply addressed the feasibility of each option based on
the legal constraints and internal factors such the treatment of the existing workers by a
new entity. YTB's counterproposal lacked the citizens' and customers' perspectives
although the public transportation policy issues should be based primarily on their
perspectives and interests.
3.5 Concluding remarks
The financial and operating performance of Yokohama's municipally owned subway and
bus system is poor. Combined with the city's poor fiscal condition, this poor performance
of the public transit systems has raised the option of privatization. Under the direction of
the aggressive reformer, Mayor Nakada, the Ad-hoc Committee of Public Transportation
was established to review the issues under the current public ownership and develop a
reform plan. Although the Ad-hoc Committee proposed that the city should privatize both
subway and bus systems, their arguments lacked evidence supporting their
recommendation and were not comprehensive. Likewise, the counterproposal developed
by the Yokohama Transportation Bureau included several critical flaws, and its
arguments were also not comprehensive. In the end, both parties seemingly represented
their own interest groups (the Ad-hoc Committee for the mayor and YTB for itself) and did
not present convincing arguments for the citizens of Yokohama. Given this incomplete
and unsatisfactory argument on privatization, more comprehensive analysis should be
conducted to present the strategic direction of the municipal transit systems in
Yokohama.
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Chapter 4: Social Impact of Privatization
This chapter examines the social impact associated with the privatization of public
transportation and considers their implications for the municipal transit systems in
Yokohama and other Japanese municipalities. Using the actual examples of privatization,
the social impact of each privatization model defined in Chapter 2 is analyzed. To begin
with, the key public concerns with privatization are discussed. Then, quantitative and
qualitative analysis is presented to examine the validity of each concern using the data
obtained from selected cases of privatization which are relevant to Japanese
municipalities. Finally, synthesizing these analyses, this chapter recommends potentially
desirable models for the municipal transit systems in Yokohama and other Japanese
municipalities.
4.1 Public Concerns about the Privatization of Public Transportation
Privatization is always controversial. When a government announces a privatization plan
for a given public service, intense arguments against privatization always arise.
Opponents of privatization argue that privatization would damage the public interest and
welfare. They view a privatized company just like a fierce tiger released from a cage; they
argue that a privatized company released from government control will focuses on profit
maximization and sacrifice the public interest and welfare. In the privatization of public
transportation, the following issues are frequently raised and used as major arguments
opposing privatization.
" Fare increase: The opponents of privatization argue that a privatized company tends
to increase fares greatly in order to improve profitability. Their underlying assumption
is that a privatized company is an unregulated natural monopoly which can earn
monopoly profits by raising fare levels.
* Worsened service quality: The opponents also argue that the service quality of public
transportation tends to be worsened due to the profit seeking behavior of a privatized
company. The key assumption behind this argument is again that a privatized
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company is a natural monopoly which does not have to worry about the loss of
customers to its competitors.
" Lower safety: Another argument against the privatization of public transportation is
that the post-privatization safety level would be lower because a privatized company
would focus on profit excessively and make light of the safety standards. Opponents
also argue that the loss of experienced engineers and workers due to lay-offs or
wage cuts after privatization would lower safety standards in the post-privatization
era.
" Abandonment and dilution of socially necessary routes: Since a privatized company
needs to maximize profit and shareholders' value, the opponents are concerned that
a profit-seeker would be motivated to focus only on the profitable routes and abandon
or decrease unprofitable but socially necessary routes or dilute the service provision
over these routes. This abandonment or dilution combined with fare increases would
harm low-income and other transit-dependent segments of the public.
" Layoffs: Opponents are also concerned that a privatized company would lay off
existing workers or cut wage levels to increase profits. Among the items of operating
expense, labor cost is usually the largest so that the impact from its reduction could
be considerable. The labor unions in public entities usually strongly oppose
privatization because they are afraid that a privatized company would be motivated to
sacrifice labor in the interest of cost reduction.
Although these arguments seem plausible, their validity needs to be carefully examined
based on the evidence from actual cases of privatization because, as earlier stated, the
privatization argument frequently depends more on belief than on evidence. In particular,
a distinction should be made on whether each issue is caused by deregulation or by
privatization. To make such distinction, the validity of each issue should be tested along
the two dimensions - the degree of privatization and deregulation. Finally for supported
issues, the question of whether the concern is valid in the context of Japanese municipal
public transportation should be addressed.
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4.2 Fare Increases
Possible increases in the fare levels of public transportation after privatization are a
legitimate public concern. Opponents argue that a privatized entity will increase fare
levels unfairly for its profit and this will damage transit-dependent segments of the public.
However, fare increases do not necessarily occur even after full privatization as long as
government regulates a private operator effectively. Furthermore, even if fare increases
do occur after privatization, there might be other factors, including deregulation,
contributing to the increases; privatization itself might not be the reason for such
increases. Opponents often attribute the post-privatization fare increase to privatization
itself.
4.2.1 Empirical Analysis
Private operators are unlikely to increase fare levels in the privatization cases in which
government effectively retains strong regulatory power over public transportation even
after full privatization. In such cases, the public concern about post-privatization fare
increase does not have validity from the beginning.
Indeed, in many cases of the privatization of public transportation, government prevents
private operators from increasing real fare levels unfairly for the sake of their profit by
retaining or introducing fare regulations. In the SMRT case which is an example of a
concession model, the Singapore National Government and its Public Transportation
Council (PTC) strictly control public transit fare levels. More specifically, the PTC
determines the maximum fare levels using a formula, set by the Government
Parliamentary Committee, which reflects inflation (Consumer Price Index) and real
purchasing power (the change in national average monthly earnings over the previous
year)(Lam and Toan, 2006). Based on the formula, SMRT or other private operators
submit a fare adjustment application to PTC which must be approved by the council
(SMRT, 2006). In sum, there is no room for private operators including SMRT to increase
the fare level unfairly in order to enjoy monopoly rent even after privatization. Figure 4-1
shows the trends of real fare levels of the MRT system between 1990 and 2006, which
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are measured by the maximum cash fares. In fact, between pre and post privatization
eras, there is no significant change in fare levels although the fare levels increased
slightly more than inflation right after privatization.
Figure 4-1: REAL FARE LEVEL OF SMRT
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Similarly, the regulations imposed by Japan's central government do not allow the JRs to
manipulate the fare levels to make monopoly profits. Similar to the fare levels of other
public transportation systems in Japan, those of the JRs have been strictly controlled by
the central government (the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport: MOLIT)
through the yardstick competition scheme even after full privatization. The yardstick
competition scheme is a regulatory method which promotes "competition between
regulated units indirectly" (Vickers and Yarrows, 1997). The maximum fare levels that one
operator can charge depends on the cost levels of others. By analyzing the operating
cost level of operators, MOLIT first sets the annual standard unit cost by mode (railways
and bus) and by region. If actual unit cost for a given operator is less than the standard
unit cost, the median between the actual and standard cost is determined as the base
unit cost. Then, the maximum fare level is determined by adding half of the cost reduction
per unit achieved after the last fare revision to the base unit cost. If the actual unit cost of
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a given operator is more than the unit standard cost, the standard cost is set as the base
unit cost for the operator. The maximum fare level is then determined by subtracting half
of the cost increase per unit from the base unit cost. Because the standard cost reflects
the cost of other operators, the fare levels of a given operator depend on its cost
performance relative to other operators. In this way, MOLIT introduces competitive
pressure and an incentive for operators to be cost efficient, and controls the fare levels of
each operator at the same time.
In fact, the fare levels of the JRs changed only once between 1987, the year of
privatization, and 1999, and real fare levels have decreased since 1987 (Mizutani, 1999)
(Table 4-1). In comparison, the pre-privatization fare levels had increased almost every
year between 1981 and 1986 (Mizutani, 1999) at an average rate of 6.6%. This analysis
of the fare revision of JRs since privatization is somewhat counterintuitive particularly for
the opponents of privatization who argue that a privatized company tends to increase
fares to obtain monopoly profits.
Table 4-1: FARE INCREASES FOR JNR AND JRs
Date of increase Inflation Infla-adj.
fare (%) (%) Increase
revision (%}
198114120 97% 4 8% 4,9%
198214120 6,1% 3,8% 2.3%
198414120 8,2% 0 9% 7 3%
198514120 4,4% 4.4% 00%
Privatization 1986911 4.8% 07% 41%19891411 3 0% 3 0% 0 0%
19971411 1,0% 12,4% -11 4%
Source: Mizutani (1999).
In the case of London Bus, which is another example of a PFP model, TfL and the mayor
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of London directly control and determine the bus fare levels. TfL annually reviews fare
levels based on inflation, the price elasticity to demand, and the prices offered by winning
bidders. Base on this review, the mayor of London finally determines the fare level
(Verma, 2007). Although private operators could narrowly influence the fare levels via the
bid price, this is unlikely to be a significant factor due to competition in the bidding
process. Figure 4-2 shows how the real average fare per kilometer changed between
1985 and 2005. Real fare levels rapidly increased from 1990 reaching a peak in 1997.
Fare levels decreased from 16.1 in 2000 to 12.9 pence in 2005. This is perhaps because
TfL intentionally held the fares constant from 2000 to 2003 in spite of inflation (TfL, 2003).
Figure 4-2: REAL FARE LEVEL OF LONDON BUS
Pre-Privatization Post-Privatization
(Pence per Km)
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Source: TfL: Market Report 2000, Travel Report 2005, T. Nakajima Analysis
However, once government loses its regulatory power over the fare setting of public
transit, the risk of real fare increases does arise. After privatization, the role of local Traffic
Commissioners in setting fare levels was severely limited in UK local bus services (Cowie
and Asenova, 1999). Due to the weak government power over fares, the fares for local
bus services increased dramatically throughout the U.K. except for London. In two years
after the privatization, the real fare level increased by 25% (Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer,
1990). Between 1985 and 1994, the fare levels increased by approximately 17%
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(Lawton-Smith, 1995). According to the analysis for the longer term between FY1 985 ('85
and '86) and FY1 999 ('99-'00), real fare levels increased by 30% (Rye and Wilson, 2002).
All these studies show that fare increases in real terms since privatization have been
significant.
4.2.2 Discussion and Implications for Yokohama
As these cases indicate, opponents' arguments that privatization of public transportation
will cause fare increase is not necessarily true at least in the developed nations. In the
UK local bus services, the example of the market-oriented full privatization model, fare
levels did indeed increase dramatically after privatization, however, this was due to
deregulation of fares, not privatization itself. In fact, as the cases of the SMRT, JNR
privatization, and London Bus suggest, a privatized company cannot easily influence the
fare level when a government retains regulatory power even after full privatization.
Furthermore, even under public ownership or before privatization, the real fare levels
sometimes increase significantly as the cases above and the case of the London
Underground show. Although the London Underground is still operated directly by the
London Government (TfL), the real fare levels have increased drastically. Between 1985
and 2005, fares increased by 55% (Figure 4-3). In sum, whether fare levels increase
does not depend on the extent to which a government retains ownership over public
transportation (privatization). As the UK local bus and London Underground cases
suggests, fare increase can be attributed to other factors, not to privatization.
However, it should also be noted that the private companies can sometimes put pressure
on government or politicians to make regulations more favorable for them. Particularly
when government depends on a single company for the provision of public transit
services, such a company may attempt to exert its strong influence on fare regulation. To
minimize the political pressures from the private sector, in many cases, government
establishes an independent regulatory commission which independently monitors and
regulates fares.
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Figure 4-3: REAL FARE LEVEL OF LONDON UNDERGROUND
(Pence per Km)
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Source: TfL: Market Report 2000, Travel Report 2005, T. Nakajima Analysis
Given the above analysis, it can reasonably be concluded that the real fare levels of
municipal public transit systems in Yokohama and other Japanese cities would not
necessarily increase after privatization as long as the city or the central government
retains their current regulatory power. Indeed, private railway companies in Japan
maintain low fare levels due to the yardstick competition scheme employed by MOLIT.
Similar to the JRs or other public transit operators, the municipal transit systems in Japan
are subject to MOLIT's yardstick competition scheme.
4.3 Service Quality
This section examines the public's concern that a privatized company might sacrifice
service quality for the sake of profit. It is difficult to measure the impact of privatization on
service quality because of the limited availability of direct measures of service quality.
Some operators measure the level of customer satisfaction annually. Others measure the
punctuality of arrival and departure, which is a partial measure of service quality. In
addition, operators frequently do not disclose the data indicating operating performance
and service quality in detail. Therefore, this research analyzes the privatization impact on
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service quality for each case by examining what data are available. This thesis also
measures the passenger growth of each case as an indirect measure of service quality
given that the number of passengers will grow when service quality improves if the real
fare levels are maintained (or increased) other things being equal.
4.3.1 Empirical Analysis
On the one hand, there is risk that cost reduction efforts by a private operator could lead
to lower service quality. On the other hand, a private operator could improve service
quality to attract more passengers in order to increase revenue. Both arguments seem
plausible in the sense that a private company can increase profits either by cutting costs
or enhancing revenue. However, for long-term growth, it seems more rational for a transit
operator to obtain a strong customer franchise by providing better service. In fact, in all
cases examined in this research, private operators have enhanced service quality since
privatization.
In the case of SMRT, service quality has improved in terms of several measures as
shown in Figure 4-4 since the IPO in 2000. First, service punctuality has continuously
improved over time; in 1999, the year before the IPO, the on-time train arrival rate was
95%, but this had improved to 97.6% in 2006. SMRT has also improved the on time train
departure rate from 98.8% in 1999 to 99.1% in 2006. Second, the train service availability
rate has been maintained at 99.9%. Given this performance, it is reasonable to conclude
that the privatization of SMRT has had a positive impact on service quality (or at the very
least, there has been no negative impact).
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Figure 4-4: SMRT SERVICE QUALITY
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Source: SMRT Annual Reports 2003 & 2006, T. Nakajima Analysis
The number of passengers per kilometer has been growing steadily in spite of the real
fare increases (Figure 4-5). Although it is difficult to determine how much the
improvement of service quality alone has contributed to this passenger growth, the
improvement should at least partially contribute to this growth because the real fare
revenue increased after the IPO.
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Figure 4-5: PASSENGER GROWTH VS. FARE CHANGE OF THE MRT
SYSTEM
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Source: SMRT Corporation: Annual Reports, T. Nakajima Analysis
Similar to SMRT, the six Japan Railway Companies (JRs) have significantly improved
service quality since full privatization in 1987. The service frequency, for example, has
dramatically improved (see Figure 4-6), and more customer-oriented innovations such as
a telephone reservation system and a clock-face timetable have been introduced (Fukui
et al., 1994, Mizutani, 1999). As many experts have recognized, the precision of JR
trains' arrivals and departures is almost an art form and meets the highest standards
throughout the world in spite of the high frequency of service. Furthermore, many JR
stations have also been remodeled for passenger convenience. For example, small retail
sections with restaurants, grocery stores, and other specialty stores have been opened
within major stations so that commuters can purchase goods on their way home without
exiting from their transfer station.
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Figure 4-6: CHANGE IN TRAIN DENSITY* OF JRs
(Index:1987-1998)
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Source: Mizutani and Nakamura (2000), T.Nakajima analysis
Due to the improved service quality combined with other factors such as the decreased
real fare levels, the number of passengers (passenger km) even including rural JRs
operating in low population density regions has increased from 205 billion passenger
kilometers in 1987 to 246 billion passenger kilometers in 2005 or a 1.02% annual
compound growth rate.
Although the data before 2000 could not be obtained, the data between 2001 and 2005
indicates that the service quality of London Bus service has been improved and
maintained at a high level (Table 4-2). The percentage of schedule operated has
improved slightly and average excess waiting time on high frequency routes has
decreased from 2 minutes in 2001 to 1.1 minutes in 2005. Finally, the passenger
satisfaction levels have been slightly improved over this period. However, note that
factors such as increased subsidy for private operators in addition to privatization itself
might contribute to these improvements.
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Table 4-2: SERVICE QUALITY OF LONDON BUS
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
ercentag
ope ateedule 96.1 96.1 97.2 97.7 97.7
WaitTime 2.0 1.8 1.4 1.1 1.1
Minutes
Passenger 75.3 76.0 77.0 77.0 77.0
Satisfaction*
Average of high-traff ic routesOut of total score 100
Source: TfL: Market Report 2000, Travel Report 2005, T. Nakajima Analysis
In addition to service quality enhancement, some innovative services were also
introduced after privatization including mini buses which allow operators to offer more
frequent service on low ridership routes. Although these innovative services are planned
and implemented by TfL, it would perhaps not be feasible without leveraging the capacity
of private contractors.
Combining the analysis above with the fact that the number of passengers has been
growing rapidly (Figure 4-7), the overall service quality of London Bus services do not
seem to have been negatively affected by privatization. However, it should also be noted
that factors other than the service quality (e.g., the congestion pricing introduced in 2003
and lower real fares) have also contributed to passenger growth.
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Figure 4-7: PASSENGER GROWTH vs. FARE CHANGE OF LONDON BUS
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Source: TfL: Market Report 2000, Travel Report 2005, T. Nakajima Analysis
eal fares (Index**)
-Privatization
Even in the UK local bus case, an example of a market-oriented full privatization, the
service quality seems to have improved since privatization. As Gomez-lbanez and Meyer
described, before the privatization of UK local bus services, the proponents and
opponents had completely different perspectives on the post privatization service quality.
Proponents expected private operators to improve service quality which would attract
more passenger traffic than before. In contrast, opponents argued that privatization
would create local monopolies that were likely to lower service quality with higher real
fares (Gomez-lbanez and Myer, 1990).
Contrary to the speculation of opponents, at least in some respects, the service quality
seems to have improved after privatization. For example, the service frequency has been
enhanced because of the introduction of mini buses to replace traditional double-deckers
(Rye and Wilson, 2002, Gomez-lbanez and Meyer, 1990) (Figure 4-8). The introduction
of minibuses has been one of the most positive changes in local bus services because it
benefits passengers due to improved frequency, more direct routes, and higher speed
(Gomez-lbanez and Meyer, 1990). In one city, the ridership increased by 180% with a
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40% reduction of operating cost per mile after the introduction of minibuses
(Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer, 1990). The service availability has also been enhanced; bus
operating kilometers have been increased by 25% due to the introduction of minibuses
(Lawton-Smith, 1995).
Figure 4-8: FLEET MIX OF UK LOCAL BUS SERVICES
Minibus
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Source : The Department of Transport, the UK(1996 and 2006), Helen Lawton-Smith(1996),
T. Nakajima analysis
4.3.2 Discussion and Implications for Yokohama
There is no evidence indicating that privatization, regardless of privatization model,
negatively affects service quality of the post-privatization public transit at least in the
cases examined above. Rather, all these cases show that service quality has improved
after privatization. In some cases, this might be because operators can increase service
quality without incurring significant additional costs. For example, punctual operation
does not incur significant additional cost because cost required for such punctual
operation is already reflected in the existing plan and budget (in many public operations,
operators just do not follow the pre-determined standards and schedule). In other words,
the real issue in the service quality in many cases is how to motivate operators to follow
the minimum standards. In this sense, private operators would have more incentive to
achieve the minimum service quality to attract and retain more passengers since these
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operators can increase revenue without incurring additional costs. In contrast, public
operators which usually obtain subsidies may not care as much about service quality
because they do not have to be as concerned with profit as their private counterparts.
It should be also noted that private operators are likely to be better in terms of investment
management to introduce innovative service (e.g., minibuses in the London and UK local
bus case). As long as increased demand and sufficient returns can be expected, the
investment for new service can be justified. However, the capital budgeting for the
required investment in the public sector is generally less flexible and may be insufficient
to implement capital intensive service innovations such as the introduction of minibuses.
In contrast, the private sectors can raise the required funds more easily if the expected
return is sufficient.
As the cases of SMRT and London Bus show, the pressure from government through
contracts seems to be another important factor for the improved service quality by private
operators. TfL records the service quality levels of private operators and uses their
performance as a factor in contract renewal. Likewise, the Singapore Government
monitors the service performance of private tenders including SMRT and might consider
these performance records in contract renewal8 . In this way, government can make
private contractors sensitive to their service performance.
Although it is premature to conclude that privatization always improve service quality
positively, it seems reasonable to argue that privatization can at least contribute to
service quality enhancement. In other words, the argument that privatization would
worsen public transit service quality of public transit is not a strong reason to stop
privatization for the municipal transit systems of Yokohama and other municipalities in
Japan.
8 Specific criteria for a contract renewal of the MRT system do not seem to have determined yet since the 30-year
contract with SMRT just begun in 2000.
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4.4 Safety
The public is greatly concerned about the safety of public transportation particularly after
privatization because opponents frequently argue that a privatized company is likely to
sacrifice safety for the sake of cost reduction. Indeed, ensuring the safety of public transit
systems sometimes requires huge investment which squeezes short-term profit. In
addition, fatal rail accidents such as the Hatfield crash in the UK and the Amagasaki
crash in Japan caused by private operators have amplified the public anxiety about the
safety. The cause of the Hatfield rail crash was widely attributed to the primitive
management of the railway network by the privatized railway network company, Railtrack.
Japanese journalists attributed the cause of the Amagasaki rail crash, which killed 106
passengers and a driver, to the excessive profit seeking behavior of JR West. According
to journalists, the competition between JR West and private railway companies and the
extreme punctuality-orientation of JR West ultimately put unnecessary pressure on the
train driver.
However, it should be examined objectively whether such accidents are directly related to
privatization. Although it is difficult to find evidence indicating direct correlation between
accidents and privatization, the quantitative evidence about whether the probability of
accident increases after privatization should be presented. In this section, such evidence
will be explored by analyzing the data from SMRT, an example of the concession model,
JRs, and the UK National Rail, examples of the publicly controlled full privatization model.
Unfortunately, the cases of the UK local bus services are not examined because safety
indicators are not publicly available, to the author's knowledge. Likewise, the
safety-related data for London Bus could not be analyzed due to the limited data
availability (the only data available is between 2003 and 2006, which is significantly
distorted by the terrorist attacks in 2005).
4.4.1 Empirical Analysis
The safety level of SMRT has been considerably improved since the IPO in 2000. Figure
4-9 shows the customer injury rate per million passengers declining from 0.11 per million
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passengers in 2000, the year of the IPO, to 0.03 in 2001 and to 0.01 since 2003. This
analysis strongly suggests that the IPO (i.e., privatization) has contributed significantly to
the safety level of the MRT system.
Figure 4-9: SMRT CUSTOMER INJURY RATE
(%: Rate per million passengers)
CAGR: -33%
(I {Lflr nj nn~rin
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Source: SMRT Annual Reports 2003 & 2006, T. Nakajima Analysis
The safety level of all of JRs has also been significantly improved since 1987, the year of
full privatization as Figure 4-10 shows. Although the public attributed the cause of the
fatal Amagasaki rail crash to looser safety standards after privatization, the long-term
data below could nullify such an argument because the data shows the accident rate was
reduced by 85% between 1987 and 1998. Likewise, in other JRs, the accident rate was
improved considerably (by 68%, 76%, 61%, 61%, and 46% for JR East, JR Central, JR
Hokkaido, JR Shikoku, and JR Kyushu, respectively). On average, the rate for all JRs
was reduced by 66%.
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Figure 4-10: ACCIDENT RATE* OF JRs
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Even in the case of UK National Rail whose safety levels are generally believed
worsened particularly after privatization, the number of fatal accidents has decreased
dramatically according to the statistical research by Evans (2006). Figure 4-11 shows the
historical trend of fatal accidents and billion passenger-kilometers between 1967 and
2006. The key point of this figure is that the number of fatal accidents has decreased
drastically in spite of the service growth over this period. Even in the period of
privatization from 2001 to 2006, the number of fatal accidents decreased modestly. In
short, the criticism about safety including the Hatfield crash after privatization of UK
National Rail has been exaggerated by journalists and opponents.
(%*)
JR EAST
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Figure 4-11: HISTORICAL TREND OF FATAL ACCIDENTS IN THE UK
NATIONAL RAIL
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4.4.2 Discussion and Implications for Yokohama
Although the number of cases is limited, the analysis above suggests that safety
standards are not necessarily worse in private hands than in public hands. Rather, at
least in seven samples in the two cases, the safety standards have been improved
dramatically. Such dramatic improvements in safety levels could be attributed to several
reasons. First, private companies have a strong incentive to prevent accidents which
damage their financial condition and reputation severely. If a fatal accident occurs, a
private company may teeter on the brink of bankruptcy in the worst case. Second,
government would implicitly or explicitly place strong pressure on privatized entities to
improve safety levels because government would be blamed if the number of accidents
increases after privatization. Indeed, in many nations, government exerts its strong
regulatory power to improve the safety levels of transportation companies. MOLIT in
Japan, for example, has the ultimate authority to stop the operations of a transportation
company which had a fatal accident and has not improved safety levels. Such potential
public intervention might work as a strong deterrent to lax safety standards for private
operators.
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After all, an accident could happen anytime regardless of the ownership type when an
operating company slackens its relentless focus on safety. However, if the City of
Yokohama or other municipalities privatize its municipal public transit systems, the city
should pay attention to the risk of disastrous accidents such as the Hatfield rail crash.
Although the numbers from the UK National Rail shows the safety levels has not been
worsened as journalists argue, the Hatfield rail crash still provides a simple lesson that
operating railway systems requires well-trained operators and managers with technical
expertise in railway systems. As Wolmar revealed, the management team of Railtrack
and its appointer (i.e., the central government) dismissed technical expertise and
believed that anyone with a good sense of management could manage the railway
network (2001). As a result, senior managers did not understand the importance of
reports that implied the possibility of accidents and ignored them. In a privatization
process, government should recognize the importance of pubic transportation expertise
and make efforts to preserve such expertise in successor entities.
4.5 Abandonment and Dilution of Transit Service Provision
The ultimate goal of a firm is to maximize profit and shareholders' value. Therefore, once
a public transportation service is privatized, a privatized entity will focus on this ultimate
goal by using resources efficiently and focusing on profitable activities. On the other hand,
the ultimate objective of public transportation is to ensure accessibility for the public by
providing a comprehensive and high quality transportation network. There is a clear
conflict between the activities as a profit seeker and those as a universal transit service
provider. Given this conflict, managers of a privatized company might prioritize the
profit-maximizing goal and abandon unprofitable but socially necessary routes that
ensure universal accessibility for the public or dilute the service provision on these routes.
This is one of the major reasons why the public is concerned about privatization.
There is no single definition of socially necessary routes. The City of Yokohama defines a
socially necessary route as a route which does not have substitute service within a 10 to
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15 minute-walk distance (i.e., approximately an 800-1250 meter radius). The substitute
routes include routes of other public transit systems. TfL seems to have a definition
similar to Yokohama; TfL sets the standard of providing routes anywhere in London
where there are no alternatives within 400 meters (TfL, 2000).
Limited data availability makes it difficult to measure the privatization impact on such
socially necessary routes. First, in many cases, data showing abandonment of routes or
dilution of service provision in these routes are seldom disclosed systematically. Second,
even when such data are disclosed, it is difficult to distinguish between socially
necessary routes and simply unprofitable routes. The decision by a privatized company
to alter its routes should not be always criticized because it might merely cut an
unprofitable and redundant route. In this section, in spite of the difficulties and limitations
described above, the impact of privatization on unprofitable but socially necessary routes
is examined by using available sources.
4.5.1 Empirical Analysis
The public is concerned that privatization causes the abandonment of unprofitable but
socially necessary routes or the dilution of service on such routes. However, similar to the
concern about fare increase, such public concerns would lose their validity if a privatized
entity cannot determine the service abandonment or dilution for a specific route on its
own without a governmental approval. This is particularly true for a concession model by
definition because planning a transit network structure and service standards are in
public hands in this model. For example, in the case of the MRT system, the Singapore
national government (the Land Transport Authority) plans the network structure of the
MRT system and a bus system. Therefore, SMRT Corporation could not change the
route and frequency of service not only for the MRT system but also for its bus system.
Although the data directly showing route abandonment or service dilution are not
available, it is reasonable to speculate that socially necessary routes would be rarely
abandoned in the London Bus network because TfL directly plans the routes and
schedules. Hence, private operators have no influence over the network planning. In
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addition, TfL is likely to maintain socially necessary routes even when they are
unprofitable because its goal is universal accessibility via public transportation.
Even in the case in which government does not have such strong power in setting routes
and service standards as the Singapore national government, privatization does not
necessarily trigger service dilution or abandonment. The studies by Mizutani (1999) and
Mizutani et al. (2000) show that there is no evidence that privatized JRs have abandoned
unprofitable lines. Before privatization, the public were concerned that privatized
companies would "ruthlessly" abandon or dilute service provision over routes in rural
areas which tend to be unprofitable (Mizutani, 1999). Both studies adopted the same
methodology; they chose local unprofitable lines and investigated the change in service
availability, service frequency, departure times of the first and last trains, the number of
passenger cars, and service quality at stations along the routes. The empirical results in
the two studies consistently show that there is no service elimination in the ten years after
privatization and that other service measures have also been maintained; these results
negated the public concern (Mizutani, 1999, Mizutani and Nakamura, 2000). Mizutani
and Nakamura also found that even the three-island JRs which cover disadvantaged
regions have also maintained local routes well (2000).
However, it should also be noted that these studies were made before the regulation of
route abandonment was removed by the national government in 2000. The national
government used to require that a transit operator obtain approval from local
governments along the route to be abandoned. The regulation also required the transit
operator to ensure substitute service such as bus service for an abandoned route.
Therefore, it was difficult for public transit operators to abandon unprofitable routes. In
contrast, after deregulation, operators can exit from an unprofitable route basically by
notifying local governments of their intent 60 days before exit. Due to this deregulation,
the risk that transit operators will eliminate unprofitable but socially necessary routes has
increased.
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The existing studies about UK local bus privatization show that total operating length of
the local bus services has been extended since privatization in 1986. Rye and Nigel
reported that the length of operating bus network outside London has increased by 24%
between 1986 and 2000 (2002). In addition, local public authorities provide subsidies for
unprofitable but socially necessary routes and ensure provision through a competitive
tendering process in which the bidder with the lowest price wins. In this way, local
authorities minimize the amount of subsidy (Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer, 1990).
Furthermore, the Rural Development Commission supports rural bus services which
cannot be operated without subsidies (Lawton-Smith, 1995). Combining these facts, the
1986 privatization does not seem to have led to the abandonment of socially necessary
routes.
4.5.2 Discussion and Implications for Yokohama
Although the availability of quantitative data is extremely limited, given the analysis
presented above, there is no strong evidence supporting the argument that privatization
causes the abandonment of unprofitable but socially necessary routes or the dilution of
service provision over these routes. The key lesson learned here is that government
should continue to take a significant role in the protection of such routes. In all cases
examined above, a central or local government continuously commits to the retention of
socially necessary routes after privatization. Even in the case of the UK local bus service,
an example of market-oriented full privatization, the local governments and the Rural
Development Commission intervene in such cases. Privatization refers just to the
ownership transfer of public assets, not to the abandonment of the public responsibility of
government. In this sense, the validity of the decision made by the Japanese government
to deregulate the exit barriers is questionable.
The deregulation by the Japanese national government increases the risk that privatized
bus operators in Yokohama and other municipalities would easily abandon unprofitable
routes without efforts to improve their performance or provide alternative services.
Therefore, municipal governments should find other means to prevent privatized
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operators from abandoning socially necessary lines. When the municipal governments
privatize their transit systems, the municipal governments could regulate such private
behavior through direct control, municipal ordinance, or partial public operation after
privatization.
4.6 Labor impact of Privatization
Opponents of privatization, in particular labor unions, argue that a privatized company
tends to dismiss existing employees and/or cut the wages to obtain cost reduction.
However, labor reduction will not always result from privatization because service
innovation can expand the market and increase employment (Gomez-lbanez and Meyer,
1994). In fact, Megginson showed that total employment remains the same or even
increases after privatization based on empirical research which examined privatization
cases throughout the world (1998). In this section, the employment impact of public
transit privatization is examined
4.6.1 Empirical Analysis
Figure 4-12 shows the historical trend of the number of SMRT employees between 1998
and 2002. Because SMRT expanded employment by acquiring other companies and
establishing new subsidiaries after 2002, the SMRT employment data after 2002 includes
not only the number of employees for existing businesses but also these of new ones. To
exclude this influence and focus on the impact of privatization only on the existing transit
businesses, this research used the data between 1998 and 2002. As Figure 4-13
suggests, there is no clear change in employment after privatization. Although there
might be employment replacement after the IPO, at least the total number of employees
did not change significantly. Because the data indicating the wage levels in the MRT
system is not available, how the IPO influenced the wage levels for the system cannot be
analyzed. However, the labor cost per capita for the entire SMRT in the same period did
not change significantly. Therefore, it is plausible that the IPO of SMRT did not have a
significant negative impact on employees.
T Nakajima
Privatization of Transit in Yokohama
Figure 4-12: NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES OF THE MRT SYSTEM
Pre-Privatization Post-Privatization
CAGR: -0.8o
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Source: SMRT Annual Reports 2002, T. Nakajima Analysis
In the JNR case, the net unemployment due to the privatization was insignificant because
of the government's strategy, although the central government dismissed a considerable
amount of employees in the 1987 privatization. Since 1964, JNR had shown operating
losses mainly because of passenger leakage owing to motorization and redundant
employees who had been protected by strong labor unions (Mizutani and Nakamura,
2000). In 1985, there were 280,000 employees including 93,000 redundant workers
(Fukui, et al., 1994).
Although the management of JNR and the central government attempted to implement
several reform plans in order to obtain relief from financial distress "unfair labor practices"
augmented by strong labor unions nullified those attempts (Fukui, et al., 1994). The
frustrated government then decided to privatize JNR in order to bring sound operation
back to the company. In the privatization in 1987, the central government cut almost all
redundant workers (i.e., 33% of total employees as of 1985). However, the government
also enacted a special law for the reemployment of the redundant workers and prioritized
their job transfer into collaborating industries. As a result, there was little unemployment
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due to the privatization; only 1047 workers who resisted the privatization to the end finally
lost their jobs (Mizutani and Nakamura, 2000). This small unemployment should not be
attributed to the cost reduction desire of the government and privatized JRs. In fact, wage
levels were increased by 11% to motivate workers to improve efficiency (Mizutani, 1999);
the labor cost associated with the 1047 dismissed workers was trivial compared with this
wage increase. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the privatization of JNR resulted in
a positive labor impact, given the government's strategy on redundancy.
The total employment level of the UK local bus services has not changed significantly
since 1985. Figure 4-13 indicates the change in the number of employees by function.
Since full privatization, the number of drivers has increased by approximately 20%. In
comparison, the number of maintenance and other staff (e.g., overhead) have been
dramatically reduced. Specifically, the number of maintenance and other staff decreased
by 46% and 35%, respectively, in the last 20 years. This reduction was the result of
natural attrition and early-retirement programs with large severance payments
(Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer, 1990). However, because of the growing number of drivers,
total employment has now recovered to the level of 1986.
Given the data described above, it might be true that privatization has created more jobs
for drivers. However, it is also true that the shrinkage in the employment of maintenance
and other staff can be attributed at least partially to privatization. The competition among
bus operators led to industry-wide consolidation and created five mega players (Cowie
and Asenova, 1999). This consolidation among players has contributed to the reduction
in the unit cost of maintenance and administration, i.e., maintenance and other functional
staff. In other words, the unemployment in those areas can be attributed to the increased
organizational efficiency through increased scale. Indeed, the statistical test conducted
by Cowie and Asenova indicated that private operators emerging after privatization are
more technically efficient than public operators largely due to organizational and
managerial efficiency (1999).
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Figure 4-13: UK Bus Sector Employment
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Source: Transport Statistics Great Britain 1996 & 2006, T. Nakajima Analysis
4.6.2 Discussion and Implications for Yokohama
At least in the three cases examined above, there was no clear evidence that
privatization causes net unemployment. Although the employees in maintenance and
other functions were reduced significantly in the UK local bus service case, the total
employment remains at the same level as before the privatization. In the short-term,
employment and wage would be negatively damaged by privatization. However, if a pubic
operating entity is less productive than its private counterparts due to excess workers and
high wage levels, the rationalization of wage levels or employment can be justified. First,
the excessive cost incurred by redundant workers and high wages would be shifted to
passengers via higher fares or to tax payers. There is no reason that passengers or tax
payers should be sacrificed to protect unproductive workers. Second, such favorable
wages are socially unfair for employees in private operating companies because they do
similar work to those in a public entity but with lower wages. Third, governmental support
for the high cost structure of public operators places private operating companies at a
competitive disadvantage because, unlike public operators, their labor cost is not
covered by subsidies. In the long-term, the private efforts to improve service quality or
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introduce innovative service are more likely to attract more customers which often results
in an increase in employment (Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer, 1993) and wage levels.
To minimize the unemployment and associated social concern caused by privatization,
however, the City of Yokohama or other municipal governments in Japan should take
measures such as the facilitation of job transfer as in the case of JNR privatization. A
government may relocate the redundant workers in a privatized company to other
positions in government. Indeed, the Ad-hoc Committee of Public Transportation in the
City of Yokohama noted that the city should absorb excess employees if it privatized its
transit systems.
Yokohama and other Japanese municipalities should allow a privatized company to
reduce the wages of their public transit workers to the level of private counterparts. As
presented in the previous chapter, the wages of municipal transit workers are 20% higher
than those of its private counterparts. After all, given the fact that there are many private
operators who perform better than the Yokohama Transportation Bureau, there is no
rationale to spoil only public workers.
4.7 Concluding remarks
Opponents of the privatization of public transportation frequently argue that privatization
damages social equity and welfare. Opponents also believe that privatized operators
tend to prioritize shareholders' value maximization through cost reduction and profit
maximization and sacrifice the public interest. However, the analysis based on the actual
privatization cases in developed nations above shows no strong evidence supporting
such arguments, although this does not mean government does not have to recognize
these concerns in their privatization decisions. Rather, the analysis above suggests that
whether the public concerns become real depends not on privatization itself but on the
degree of deregulation; the less government retains its control over privatized assets, the
more social risks potentially caused by privatization increases.
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Therefore, the real issue to be resolved in order to protect the public interest is how a
privatizing government retains its control over a privatized entity and minimizes the risk
that a privatized entity behaves contrary to the public interest. Government should
actively intervene in public transportation even after privatization and mediate the internal
conflict of interests between the goals of a profit-seeking company and that of a public
transportation provider. In this sense, the market-oriented full privatization model
observed in the UK local bus service is the least desirable option among the four
managerial options identified in Ch.2. The publicly-owned model also does not seem
ideal because service quality and safety level in examined cases improved modestly after
privatization although factors other than privatization itself might have contributed to
these improvements. As the cases examined above show, public transit systems can
perform better post-privatization from the social perspective. At least for Yokohama and
other municipalities in Japan, a concession model or a publicly-controlled privatization
model are more promising with respect to the public concerns discussed above.
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Chapter 5: Financial Valuation of Privatization
This chapter evaluates the financial impact of privatization of municipally-owned
transportation systems in Yokohama. For the valuation of the impact, the perpetuity
valuation method commonly used in the private sector is applied. In addition to the value
of the public ownership model (i.e. the status-quo), the value of the two models selected
based on the consideration of social risks in the previous chapter, a concession model
and a publicly-controlled full privatization, is examined. This chapter first reviews existing
studies on the financial impact of privatization and discusses their limitations. Then, a
new approach is suggested. Next, the methodology and data applied in this chapter are
explained in detail. Applying the methodology, the financial value resulting from each
model is presented. Finally, this chapter recommends the model which has the largest
financial impact and minimizes social risks for Yokohama.
5.1 Financial impact of privatization
As described in Chapter 3, the privatization argument in Yokohama between the Ad-hoc
Committee and the Yokohama Transportation Bureau does not fully address either the
financial impact or the social impact from the perspective of the city and its citizens. The
decision whether the city should privatize its public transit systems requires a robust
analysis indicating how much financial value would be created (or lost) from privatization.
5.1.1 Prior research and its limitations
While many prior studies address the financial or operating impact of privatization, they
are rarely holistic and fail to take the perspective of a privatizing government or its
citizens. First, research on the financial impact of privatization tends to focus on the
financial improvement for a privatized company. Although privatization should influence
the public welfare because the assets of citizens are partially or wholly transferred to
private hands, most studies do not examine the total financial impact on a privatizing city
but solely on the financial improvement of a privatized company. Second, these studies
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also tend to focus on the impact in terms of specific individual metrics (e.g., sales
increase per capita and profitability) and rarely measure the total financial value created
through privatization.
Megginson (1998) showed that most asset-sale privatizations around the world have
been financially successful. Megginson (1998) and Megginson/D'Souza (1999) present
evidence that sales, profitability, cost efficiency, and other performance metrics improved
after privatization in many cases. Megginson and D'Souza show, for example, that
profitability increased by between 8.6% and 12.6% in 71% of 85 privatization cases
throughout the world and that sales per capita and income per capita increased by 79%
and 76%, respectively, after privatization (1999). Similarly, Megginson et al. (2001) show
that profitability, real sales (sales excluding subsidies), and operating efficiency improved
significantly (statistically) after privatization, using 118 cases between 1961 and 1995
around the world. Indeed, these studies show that privatization improves the financial
condition of a privatized organization in terms of the specific metrics examined. However,
these studies do not present how much total financial value is created or lost for a
government and, ultimately, its citizens. A government cannot judge whether privatization
is financially successful by looking only at separate individual metrics.
Particularly for studies of full privatization, some researchers attempt to examine key
factors affecting the trade price of a public company or asset. However, none of them
explain how practitioners can incorporate those factors into a real valuation or illustrate
how the value for a government and its citizens is determined practically.
Lopez-De-Silanes (1997) and Arin/Okten (2003) attempted to identify determinants of the
sales price of public assets in privatization. Lopez-De-Silanes argues that the following
determinants are particularly important: financial performance prior to privatization,
macroeconomic conditions, a selling government's commitment to regulation against
new entries, and speedy implementation of privatization (1997). Likewise, Arin and Okten
identified similar determinants by examining 68 privatization cases in Turkey (2003).
However, most of the determinants the two studies identified are ex post facto factors
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which are known only after privatization and so can not be incorporated explicitly in an
actual valuation process before privatization.
5.1.2 Approach of this research
Because public assets ultimately belong to citizens (i.e., tax payers), the value or impact
created by privatization should be examined from their perspective. Once these assets
are sold to private investors, the financial improvement of a privatized company ultimately
does not matter because assets no longer belong to the selling municipality and its
citizens. The real concern of the public is whether and how privatization itself can
contribute to the enhancement of the municipal welfare.
Therefore, this research attempts to quantify total financial value of privatization from the
perspective of a selling city (and ultimately its citizens) by using the perpetuity valuation
method commonly used among financial practitioners including the following items:
. Impact on tax revenue: Once a public entity is privatized, the entity is treated as a
private entry and required to pay corporate income tax. From a privatizing city's
perspective, the increase in the tax means municipal revenue enhancement.
. Impact on subsidies: the subsidies for public transportation are reduced after
privatization due to the improved performance of a privatized entity. Because a
reduction of subsidies means an increase in municipal budgets, impact of
privatization on subsidy levels should be incorporated.
. Impact on debt obligation: interest payments and residual debt levels of a
government would be influenced by privatization. For example, the sales proceeds
from investors who purchase public assets can be used to repay municipal debt, and
if the residual debt is reduced, the present value of interest payment is also reduced.
In this way, privatization might help a government reduce financial obligation for
future generations.
. Impact on labor cost of a privatizinq municipality: if a government absorbs the labor
laid off due to privatization, the labor cost for government would be increased. Thus,
T. Nakajima
Privatization of Transit in Yokohama
such shifted labor cost to a government and its citizens should be reflected in the
financial valuation of privatization.
By reflecting the impact of these items, not just the impact on the privatized entity itself,
this thesis quantifies the citizen's equity value which is created by privatization for a city
and its citizens. The citizens' equity value refers to the financial value available for
increasing municipal welfare. If this value is positive, the city can invest in other
investment opportunities to enhance the municipal welfare for its citizens as long as
government reallocates the financial value appropriately and effectively. In contrast, a
negative citizens' equity value means not only that the tax collected from citizens is
wasted but also that the financial burden for future generations is expanded. Therefore,
the city should maximize the citizens' equity value and make every effort to keep this
value positive.
5.2 Methodology
5.2.1 Valuation method- Perpetuity based valuation
There are three main valuation methods commonly used by practitioners in determining
the financial value of an asset: Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) method, Perpetuity
Valuation, and Relative Valuation. The DCF and perpetuity valuation methods are similar
because in both methods, the predicted future Free Cash Flow (FCF) is discounted by a
discount rate which reflects a specific risk for a given business. However, there is a
difference in FCF projection between the two methods. The perpetuity valuation method
assumes that financial improvement in the current year (Year 0) is reflected in Free Cash
Flow (FCF), which belongs to both debt holders and owner(s) of assets (5-1), in the next
year (Year 1) and will last forever(5-2). This assumption is appropriate particularly when
an examined asset generates relatively stable FCF almost eternally. In contrast, in the
DCF method, the FCF in a certain period usually from 5 to 10 years should be projected
and discounted by a certain discount rate, and the terminal value which is the present
value of the last projected year is added to the sum of the present values in the projected
period. The DCF method is used when the level of FCF is expected to change
significantly over the projected period. In the Relative Valuation Method, the financial
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value of an asset is calculated based on financial multiples of comparable companies.
For example, if the EBITDA multiple (Firm Value9/ EBITDA) of comparable companies is
3 on average, the firm value of the examined firm is obtained by multiplying its EBITDA by
3. This relative valuation method is employed particularly when an examined company is
not publicly listed (therefore, no share data is available) and when back-of-the-envelope
is sufficient.
Among the three methods, this research employs the perpetuity valuation method for the
following reasons. First, it can be assumed that public transit businesses particularly in
Japan can generate relatively stable FCF over time. Second, the primary purpose of
valuation analysis in this research, which is the comparison of financial value among the
examined options, does not require unnecessarily complicated procedures as required in
the DCF method (a certain methodology works neutrally for all options). Third, however,
because the value of each option should be simulated and examined rigorously, the
relative valuation method cannot meet this requirement. Finally, although the PV method
is mainly used for the valuation of a stock-listed company, this method is still applicable to
the public sector as long as assets generate a certain cash flow, the income statement
and the balance sheet are available'0 , and comparable listed companies exist. However,
note that this eternal FCF assumption is the largest limitation of the perpetuity method
because there is risk of overestimating, or underestimating, the financial value of given
assets, although this method avoids the complicated process of making five or ten-year
cash flow projections.
FCF = EBIT(1 - t) + Depreciation - Change in W.C. - CAPEX (5-1)
Where, EBIT : Earnings Before Interest and Tax
t : Coporate tax rate
W.C.: Working Capital
CAPEX: Capital Expediture
9 Firm value = Equity value (i.e., Market cap.) + Debt
10 The City of Yokohama has prepared annual financial statements based on private accounting standards since 2003
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Perpetual valueasset = Ccurrent (5 - 2)WACC - g
Where, FCF: Free Cash Flow
WACC: discounted rate
g: growth rate of free cash flow
5.2.2 Steps in Valuation
In the perpetuity method, the total value of any business or company is the present value
(PV) of the expected future FCF. Then, the value of debt and other related value items
should be added to, or subtracted from, this business value to obtain citizens' equity
value. Although items for this adjustment differ among models examined, the common
steps are as follows.
Step 1: Estimate the expected future FCF
Step 2: Determine the discount rate for obtaining the present value of future FCF
Step 3: Calculate business value
Step 4: Adjust debt and other related value items
Step1: Estimate the expected future cash-flow
The first step of estimating the expected future FCF is both most important and difficult
because it requires an industry perspective based on business experience and insight.
This research relies mainly on empirical data and case studies to make assumptions to
supplement such industry-unique knowledge in predicting the cash flow.
Before developing the FCF projection, which is simulated based on the assumptions, the
baseline FCF needs to be developed. In developing the baseline FCF for subway and
bus systems in Yokohama, this research primarily uses the financial data for 2005 which
is the latest available data. However, because the levels of subsidy, capital expenditure
(CAPEX), and depreciation since FY 2003 are greatly affected by the construction of the
new line, the following adjustments were made to normalize the baseline FCF for the
valuation of the Yokohama Municipal Subway Network (YMSN):
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" Subsidy: For the baseline FCF, the amount of subsidy in FY 2002 is used instead of
FY2005 because the city doubled the amount of subsidy to support the construction
of the new line between 2003 and 2005. After completion of the construction, it is
assumed that the city will decrease subsidy to the prior level.
. CAPEX: CAPEX in FY 2003 is used instead of 2005 because the CAPEX in FY2002,
a year before the beginning of the construction of the new line is unavailable and
because CAPEX in FY2003 is the minimum value between FY2003 and FY2005.
. Depreciation: The depreciation in FY2003 is used instead of FY 2005 to be
consistent with CAPEX because the level of deprecation expense tends to change
according to the level of CAPEX.
Based on the financial data for FY2005 and the three assumptions above, a baseline
value of V 6.3 billion FCF is obtained for the subway system (Table 5-1).
For the valuation of the bus system in contrast, no adjustment except for CAPEX is made
in the data of FY2005 because of the relatively stable fiscal condition of the system.
Average CAPEX between FY2003 and 2004 is used instead of FY2005 because CAPEX
in 2005 is distorted by the introduction of low-gas-emission buses. After this adjustment,
the baseline FCF of Y 376 million is obtained for the Yokohama Municipal Bus System
(YMBS) (Table 5-2).
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TABLE 5-1:Historical FCFs and Baseline FCF for YMSN
Million JPY
Revenue Ridership: million JPY
(# of ridership)million
(Ave. Fare) :JPY
Advertisement
Subsidy *
Total Revenue
2002 2003 2004 2005 Base
29,923 29,277 29,406 29,998 29,998
159 16 2 164 471 171
188 11 179 175 175
865 '4,852 -932 932
2,913 6,048 5,465 5,772 2,913
33,701 36,165 35,723 36,702 33,843
Labor Cost 10,610
Other Operating Cost 4,760
Operiting costs before Depreciation 15,370
Depreciation * 1377
14,979 13,911 13,354
^ ~ -A A1 -0 ~ .AA
9,298
4,056
13,354
13024
Total Operating costs 28,947 28,003 26,843 26,792 26,378
Profit EBIT 4,754 8,162 8,880 9,910 7,465
EBITDA 18,331 21,186 21,812 23,348 20,489
Tax 0 0 0 0 0
Net Income 4,754 8,162 8,880 9,910 7,465
Net Income without subsidy 1,841 2,114 3,415 4,138 4,552
Working Capital Short-term Asset less cash 10,665 13,Y0 6,095 5125 N/A
Short-term liabilities less debts 21,039 18,133 26,607 23,206 N/A
Working Caoital -10,374 -4,231 -20,512 -18,081 N/A
Change in Working Capital 6,143 -16,281 2,431 2,431
CAPEX Capital Expediture ,2 11,752
3424 14,2$9 -1,2163
*Due to the new line construction, the values of subsidy, CAPEX, and depreciation have been distorted significantly
since 2003. Therefore, for the baseline, the value of subsidy in 2002, of CAPEX in 2003, and of Depreciation in 2003
are used instead of those in 2005
Source: Annual Financial Report ("Kessan Houkoku-Syo") '03, 04, and '05 (YBT), Jack T.Nakajima
Costs
Free Cash Flow
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TABLE 5-2:Historical FCFs and Baseline FCF for YMBS
Million JPY
Revenue Ridership:million JPY
(# of ridership)million
(Ave. Fare) :JPY
Advertisement
Subsidy
Total Revenue
Costs Labor Cost
Other Operating Cost
Operiting costs before Depreciation
Depreciation
Total Operating costs
Profit EBIT
EBITDA
Tax
32,018 31,003 29,156
30,539 29,255 27,116
1,479 1,748 2,040
3,347 3,567 3,822
0 0 0
2005 Base
24,336 24,336
4 52 152
,160, 160
446, 445
2,503 2,503.
27,284 27,284
2001 20,081
.r$07O 3,801
2-3,882 23,882
293 229
26,175 26,175
1, 9 1,109
309402 3,402
0 01
Net Income 1,479 1,748 2,040 1,109 1,109
Net Income without subsidy -2,239 -1,564 -1,140 -1,394 -1,394
Working Capital Short-term Asset less cash 1,422 1,877 1,813 1,422 N/A
Short-term liabilities less debts 6,356 4,209 5,455 3,833 N/A
Working Caoital -4,934 -2,332 -3 642 -2,411 N/A
Change in Working Capital 2,602 -1,310 1,231 1,231
CAPEX Capital Expediture 3,07 1,796
Free Cash Flow 910 3416 -9O 376
* Due to the introduction of low-gas emission buses, the value of CAPEX in FY 2005 is distorted irregularly.
Thus, average CAPEX between 2003 and 2004 is used instead of 2005 for the baseline CAPEX.
Source: Annual Financial Report ("Kessan Houkoku-Syo") 03, 04, and '05 (YBT), Jack T.Nakajiina
Step2: Determine the Discount Rate
The next step is to determine the discount rate which is used to calculate the present
value of the FCF. Money tomorrow is less valuable than money today because the
uncertainty or risk in future conditions decreases the monetary value. Thus, investors
demand sufficient returns in order to compensate for the future risk. This expected rate of
return for investors is the discount rate which is based on the risk levels investors
assume. The risk (i.e., the expected rate of return) depends on the nature of the
investment. The risk in investing in the volatile high-tech industry in India is much higher
than in public transit in Japan where cash-flow is stable and is not subject to short-term
environmental changes.
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Although there is significant difference in the sources of finance between the private and
public sectors, there is still a rationale to use the same method in evaluating the risk level
of a specific public operation and asset. The operation of YMSN should face the same
business risks as private railway companies which operate in and around Yokohama
(e.g., Keihin Kyuko, Tokyu). Likewise, the operation of the municipal bus network should
face the same business risk as private bus operators (e.g., Kana-Chu). If private
companies provide service which is similar to that provided by the public sector, it is
reasonable to assume that the citizens face the same risk as private investors.
Furthermore, because the public service is operated or owned by a private company after
privatization, the business value of public assets in privatization should be determined
based on the private investors' perspective.
Specifically, in determining the discount rate, the weighted average of capital costs
(WACC) is commonly used by practitioners. WACC incorporates the volatility of the
macroeconomic conditions and the financial market in the country, the business itself,
and the capital structure (i.e., the balance between debt and shareholders' equity) of a
given company as indicated in (5-3).
-r (E 
_t(D(53
reapitaI =equi E+D 1 + rdebt(1-ED (5 -3)
Where, E: Shareholders' Equity
D: Debt
t : corporate tax rate
rdebt : interest rate
reqiity : rate of return for shareholders' equity
Because municipally-provided subway and bus services are not publicly-listed
businesses, the average WACC of comparable companies is applied by assuming that
the city's subway operation faces essentially the same risk environment as their private
counterparts. For YMSN, the average WACC of JR East, Keihin Kyuko, Sagami Tetsudo,
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and Tokyu which operate in and around Yokohama are applied (Table 5-3). For YMBS,
the average WACC of Kanachu, Nigata Kotsu, and Shinki Bus, which are operating in
relatively similar environments to Yokohama is used (Table 5-4).
TABLE 5-3: WACC ESTIMATION for YMSN
Tax rate 41%
JPN UK US
Local Risk Free rate 1.93% 5.14% 4.70%
Masket Risk Premium 3.99% 4.07% 4.43%
Millon JPY
rdl*(Cost Wegtd Risk free Mfit. risk mefCost WiheCompany Ticker Country Debt Equity' D(D+E) (1-t) Cost of EID+E) Beta" Cost of WACC
of Debt) Debt Eate Pquriu of Equity)
JR East 9020JP Jar 2,014,228 3,216,780 39% 59% 6 .% 1.6% 61% 1.93% 3.99% 0,40 .5% 22%
Keihin Kyuko 9006JP aspth 481,581 436,527 52% 59% 1i % 0.5% 48% 1 93% 3.99% 72 4.8% 2_3%
Sagami Tetsudo 9003JP japan 343,697 168,853 67% 59% 2 2% 09% 33% 1.93% 3.99% 0,34 3% 1 1%
Tokyu 9005JP . M 1,106,924 884,404 56% 59% .3% 0.6% 44% 1.93% 3.99% 036 1 1.5%
Aeage 98608 1,170,641 53% 69% 31% 0.9% 47% 1.93% 3.99% 0.46 3.7% 18% 26%
Market Value Base
**Average interest rate for debt: Interest payment / Debt
*1-istrocial Beta obtained from Bloomberg
Source: Nikkei NET, Bloonberq, JP Morgan Research, Annual Report (Kessan Tanshin) for each companies
TABLE 5-4: WACC ESTIMATION for YMBS
Tax r ate 41%
JPN UK US
Local Risk Free rate 1 23% 5,14% 470%
Market Risk Premium 3.99% 4,07% 4.43%
Million JPY
rd(otWeighted RikF e Mt ik1(otWeighted
Company Ticker Country Debt Equity' D(D+E) (1-t) rDeCt Cost EID+E) Risk Free Mris Beta" re Cot Cost of WACC
Debt Equity
Kanachu 9020JP Jpan 74,498 36.880 67% 59% 1 B% 0.7% 33% 1.93% 3.99% 03 .3% 1.1% -1%?
Niigata Kotsu 9006JP Japa 48,529 8,002 86% 59% 27% 1.4% 14% 1 93% 3 99% 03' 18% 0.5%
ShinkiBus 9003JP Japs 5,826 16,749 24% 59% 059% 01% 76% 1.93% 399% 003 2.1% 1.6%.
Averoage 42,51 21;2 0 59% 59% 12% 0.7% 41% 1.93% 39% 028 311.% 1.1% 18.%
'Market Value Base
**Average iterest rate for debt: Interest payment /Debt
*-Hstrocial Beta obtained from Bloomberg
Source: Nikkei NET. Bloomtberg, JP Morgan Research, Annual Report (Kessan Tanshin) for each companies
There are two sources of finance for any business: equity capital (shareholders' equity)
and debt (e.g., loans from bank or issued bonds). Because debt holders have collateral
and regular cash-flow from the borrowers through interest payments, the expected rate of
return (i.e., interest rate) is generally lower than the expected rate of return on equity. The
average interest rate and the rate of return on equity of the four comparable companies
for the subway system are 3.1 % and 1.8%, respectively. The average interest rate and
the rate of return on equity of the four comparable companies for the bus system are both
1.8%.
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The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), which is commonly used by investment
bankers, is employed to obtain the expected rate of return on shareholders' equity (5-4).
For the risk-free rate, the coupon (interest) rate of the 10-year national bond is commonly
used by practitioners. Investing in a national bond can be assumed risk-free because a
national government is unlikely to default particularly in developed nations. The risk-free
rate of Japan is much lower than that of the U.K. or the U.S. (1.93%, 5.14%, and 4.70%
for Japan, the U.K., and the U.S. respectively in July 2006)(JP Morgan Research).
Macroeconomic factors that influence the value of public assets in privatization
(Lopez-De-Silanes, 1997) should be reflected in the risk-free rate for each country and in
the market risk premium.
re,it = r + (r,, - r) (5-4)
Where, r1  risk - free rate
r,, capital market risk
r, - rf : market risk premium
6: covariance between the % change in a given stock and % change in the entire stock market
The market risk premium indicates how much premium investors demand when they
move investment from the risk-free assets to risky market securities because the riskier
investment is, the higher the rate of return investors demand (Damodaran, 2006). In
practice, investors apply the market risk premium which is empirically analyzed by
financial data providers because of the complicated process in obtaining the appropriate
data by themselves. This research uses 3.99% for Japan, which is estimated by JP
Morgan Research.
The last key component of the CAPM model is the beta of assets which is the
standardized covariance of a given stock with the entire market portfolio. In simple terms,
the beta of assets indicates how sensitive a given stock price is to changes in the overall
market (Damodaran, 2005). Measuring the relative movement of a given stock against
the entire market allows analysts to estimate the stock-specific risk (i.e., company-unique
risk). For example, if the beta of a given stock is exactly one, this stock price follows the
exact same pattern as the overall market; there is actually no uniqueness in terms of risk
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in such a stock. In practice, the beta can be obtained from a financial data service firm
such as the Bloomberg. Given the fact that the subway service provided by the city is not
a public company listed on the stock market, the average beta of the comparable
companies for the subway and bus systems is applied.
Integrating all composites produced the value of 2.6% and 1.8% for WACC for subway
and bus systems, respectively. However, this WACC is perhaps not sustainable over time
due to Japan's extremely low risk-free rate which is subject to national fiscal policy that
facilitates private investment using debt in order to overcome Japan's long recession. As
the national economy recovers, the Central Bank of Japan is likely to make a decision
leading to the higher risk-free rate. Therefore, for YMSN, a rate of 4.6% of WACC is
applied instead of 2.6% in this research by assuming the risk-free rate in Japan will be
soon increased from 1.93% to approximately 5%. Likewise, for YMBS, a rate of 3.8% of
WACC is applied instead of 1.8%.
Step 3: Calculate business value
As mentioned above, when measuring the business value of a public transit system, this
research adopts the perpetuity valuation method among the three major valuation
methods. Specifically, the projected FCF is discounted by the WACC calculated based on
the data of comparable companies. For the YMSN baseline case, FCF of V6.3 billion is
discounted by the WACC of 4.6%, resulting in the business value of V137 billion (Figure
5-1).
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Figure5-1 :PERPETUITY VALUE OF THE BASELINE FCF
- EXAMPLE OF YMSN
(Present Value: Billion JPY*)
Business
Value** Predicted Future Free Cash Flow137
6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3
I----- 1----- 1 ------- ----- ---
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FCFB..eI,:YO) 6.3
WACC- g 4.6%-0%
$1=V115
oWACC=4.6%: average WACC of JR East, Keihin Kyuko, Soutetsu, and Tokyu. Assuming 0% of cashFlow Growth rate
***Base Year (Baseline FCF)
Step 4: Adjust debt and other value items
Although the business value indicates the value generated from operations, it is not the
value for a municipal government and ultimately for its citizens because the value for the
city needs to incorporate the influence of debt and other value factors such as the
present value (PV) of municipal corporate tax and subsidy reduction. Because the debt
borrowed from banks and from other debt holders in the form of municipal bonds is paid
back to the debt holders, it should not be counted as part of the value of the public asset.
Thus, the value of debt should be subtracted from the business value. Likewise, other
value components which influence the value for the city and its citizens should be
subtracted from, or added to, business value. What value components should be
incorporated depends on the model of operation and ownership.
5.3 Key Assumptions for Valuation
The valuation analysis is based on the following two premises. First, the value analysis
for YMSN focuses on the existing lines and excludes the influence of the new line now
under the construction because its impact on financial items is highly uncertain. Second,
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to analyze the value of the concession model, this research assumes the fixed-cost
contract scheme under which a private contractor focuses on cost minimization
(Halvorsen and Wilson, 1995). The rationale behind this premise is that the potential to
increase ridership for public transit in Yokohama is limited, given the slow growth rate of
the city's population (a CAGR 11of 0.94%). Furthermore, as described in Chapter 3, the
urgent issue of Yokohama's transit systems is lower cost efficiency than private railway
companies. Thus, it is reasonable to assume a fixed-price contract instead of a cost-plus
contract.
In addition to the above two premises, this thesis makes specific assumptions for major
financial items. Because there is uncertainty in each financial metric and both business
and citizens' equity values are sensitive to certain metrics, three scenarios -base,
optimistic, and pessimistic - with different assumptions will be examined in order to
reflect such uncertainty and sensitivity. In setting assumptions for the base scenario, the
data from actual cases in the previous chapter are applied. However, factors specific to
Japan's or Yokohama's public transit systems such as subsidies and CAPEX are based
on interviews with government officials of the City of Yokohama and publicly available
data and reports provided by the city. In the optimistic scenario, some of the assumptions
in the base scenario are relaxed within a reasonable range. In contrast, in the pessimistic
scenario, more negative outcome for each financial item is more strictly assumed than in
the base scenario; some of the items are even assumed to worsen in this scenario. The
assumptions for YMSN and YMBS are shown in Table 5-5 and 5-6, respectively, and
discussed in the following section.
11 Compound Average Growth Rate from 1998 to 2005
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Table 5-5: SUMMARY OF ASSUMPTIONS-YMSN
Public Ownership Model
Direction of
Change "Pessimistic" BASE 0
# of Ridership + -5% 0%
Ad Fee + -5% 0%
Subsidy - 0% 0%
#of Labor - 20% 20%
Ave. Salary - 5% 5%
Other Opeating Cost - 0% 0%
CAPEX - 0% 0%
Return for contractor N/A NA
Table 5-6: SUMMARY OF ASSUMPTIONS-YMBS
Public Ownership Model
Direction of
Change "Pessimistic" BASE "Optimistic"
tic" "Pessimnistic" BASE "Optimistic" "Pessimistic" BASE Optimistic"
-5% 0% 5% 5% 10% 15%
0% 0% 5% 5% 10% 15%
0% 0% 0% 100% 100% 100%
20% 20% 20% 20% 30% 40%
5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5%
5% 10% 15% 5% 10% 15%
0% 0% 10% 0% 10% 20%
20% 15% 10% N/A N/A N/A
Concession Model PFP Model
"Pessimistic" BASE "Optimistic" "Pessimistic" BASE "Optimistic"
? of Ridership + -5% 0% 5% -5% 0% 5% 5% 1a1 15%
AdFee + -5% 0% 5% -5% 0% 5% 5% 10% 15%
Subsidy - 70% 80% 90% 70% 0% 90% 90% 90% 90%
#of Labor - 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 5% 9%
Ave. Salary - 5% 5% 5% 5% 5 5% 5% 10% 15%
Other Opeating Cost 0% 0% 5% 5% 10% 15% 5% 10% 15%
CAPEX -0% 0% 5% 0% 0% 5% 5% 10% 15%
Retumi nfor contractor NA  A N/A 15% 10% 5% N/A N N/A
5.3.1 Revenue
Fare levels: In Japan, fare regulation is based on yardstick competition and allows transit
operators to increase their fares to the regulatory-determined maximum levels for given
performance. However, it is politically and practically difficult for a public authority to
increase fares to the maximum levels because of opposition from the public. Even in a
publicly-owned full privatization (PFP) model, a private company would hesitate to
increase its fare to the regulatory determined maximum levels beyond inflation because
of the negative public reaction to the fare increase, as the JR and SMVRT cases suggest.
Thus, it is plausible to assume that the real fare levels will remain the same in all
scenarios for the three models for both YMVSN and YMBS.
Number of passengers,: In the status-quo, given the limited growth of population in
Yokohama, it is reasonable to assume that the ridership levels remain at the current
levels on the existing lines in the base scenario. Likewise, in a concession model with a
fixed-cost scheme, no increase in the ridership would be expected due to the nature of
the scheme; a private contractor does not have a strong incentive to improve the
revenue-related items. In contrast, in a PFP model, the number of passengers is
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conservatively assumed to increase by 10% in the base scenario due to improved
service quality and marketing efforts by a privatized company. In fact, PFP model cases
show considerable ridership increase after privatization. The long-term demand growth of
JR East between 1987 and 1998 in terms of million passenger-kilometers is 19% (Figure
5-2). Likewise, the ridership for London Bus after privatization has increased by 59%
between 1993 and 2005.
Figure 5-2: JRs' DEMAND GROWTH
(Million Passenger-Kim)
JR EAST All JRs
126,110 +19g
204,677
126,110
104,491 
_ _
1987 1998 1987 1998
Source: Ministry of Transports, Mizutani and Nakamura(2000), T Nakajima anaysis
However, because the change in ridership usually influences the business value
significantly and the change is highly uncertain (because the passenger growth is
influenced greatly by external factors such as population growth, congestion, and car
ownership, which transit operators cannot control), its assumption should have a certain
latitude in addition to the base scenario. Specifically, the modification of +/- 5% to the
base scenario is made for the optimistic and pessimistic scenarios.
Advertising Revenue: Given limited data available for post-privatization advertising
revenue changes, this thesis assumes that the advertising revenue is directly correlated
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with the number of passengers exposed to promotions. Hence, if ridership increases by
10%, advertising revenue would also increase by 10%. Given this assumption, there is
no increase of advertising revenue in the base scenario for the status-quo and
concession. In contrast, in the PFP model, advertising revenue is assumed to increase
by 10% in the base scenario. Likewise, in the pessimistic and optimistic scenarios, the
assumption for advertising revenue follows the exact same pattern as that for the number
of passengers.
Subsidies: For YMSN, the subsidy levels in the status-quo are assumed to remain at the
baseline (i.e., 2002) because the city continuously needs to pay large interest and
CAPEX in the form of subsidies. Even in a concession model, the subsidy levels would
remain at the baseline in all scenarios for the same reason. However, in a PFP model,
subsidies would be reduced to zero because the privatized company is responsible for
the necessary capital expenditure after the acquisition of the network; the city no longer
has to support the capital expenditure of the subway network in the form of subsidy.
In contrast, subsidies for YMBS would be reduced by approximately 90 % based on the
city's plan that the city will cut all non-required subsidies in the three models. However, in
the base scenario for the public ownership and concession models, it is conservatively
assumed that the city can cut subsidies only by 80% due to, for example, political
resistance or sluggish bureaucratic procedures. In the pessimistic scenario for these
models, it is assumed that the city can reduce subsidies by 70%. Given that 10% of the
current subsides are legally determined subsidies, even in a concession or PFP model,
the subsidies cannot be cut by 100%. Thus, for the PFP model, a 90% subsidy reduction
is assumed in all scenarios (the city has no reason to pay non-required subsidy for a fully
private company).
5.3.2 Cost Items
Labor cost: YTB plans to reduce labor costs by cutting both the number of employees
and wage levels. Based on the plan, a salary reduction of approximately 5% per
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employee is expected in both YMSN and YMBS. YTB also plans to cut the number of
employees by 20% and 3 % for YMSN and YMBS between 2005 and 200712, respectively,
mainly through attrition (retirement). In a concession model, the number of employees
and wage levels could be reduced by the same amount as the status-quo because YTB
would probably not allow its contractor to implement a more aggressive restructuring
program than YTB.
In contrast, this research assumes that a fully privatized operator of YMSN can cut
employees by 40%, increasing its labor productivity to the average productivity of private
operators in the most optimistic setting (Figure 5-3). In 2002, the labor productivity of
YMSN was 47% of the average of three private railway companies operating in and
around Yokohama 3 . Because the number of YMSN employees has been reduced by
approximately 10% since 2002, the productivity gap between YMSN and the average of
the three companies is approximately 40% as of 2005, assuming the
passenger-kilometers have remained at the same level since 2002. Therefore, this
research assumes that the number of employees for YMSN can be reduced by an
additional 40% from the 2005 levels in the most optimistic scenario. However,
considering the difference between subway systems and surface railway networks (e.g.,
scale of network), it is conservatively assumed that a privatized operator can cut the
number of employees by 30% in the base scenario. In the pessimistic scenario, it is
assumed that a privatized operator can cut the number only by 20%.
12 Based on the materials provided in interviews with government officials on Yokohama in January 18, 2007
13 See Figure 3-14
14 Based on the materials provided at the interview with government officials of the city in January 18, 2007
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Figure 5-3: LABOR PRODUCTIVITY GAP ASSUMPTION FOR YMSN
(%)
100 47 37 37
+10
53
Private YMSN Productivity Improve- Productivity Improvement
Operators (2002) Gap (2002) ment by Gap (2005) after PFP***
YMSN's
Reform*
Average of private operators = 100%
YTB's improvement through labor reduction between 2002 and 2005 by assuming that passenger-km
remained at the same level as 2002
Assumption that full privatization can improve labor productivity by 37% at most
Source: The City of Yokohama (2006), T. Nakajima Analysis
For YMBS, the fully privatized operator can not reduce the number of employees by more
than 6% in the base scenario given that this labor reduction would increase the labor
productivity of YMBS to the levels of its private counterparts15. However, in the optimistic
case, the privatized operator may try to improve the labor productivity beyond this level
by reducing employees more aggressively in the face of conflict with a labor union. In
contrast, because of strong resistance from the union, a privatized company may not be
able to achieve even the average levels in the pessimistic case.
A fully privatized bus operator could cut wages by 15% in the optimistic scenario because
the average salary level of private bus companies operating in and around Yokohama is
approximately 15% below that of YTB (Figure 5-4). However, because there might be
strong resistance from the labor union, it is conservatively assumed that the privatized
entity can achieve a 10% wage reduction in the base scenario.
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Figure 5-4: ANNUAL SALARY -PRIVATE OPERATORS VS. YTB
(Ten Thousand JPY:2003)
Subway (railway) Bus
__796 ------ 787 +14%
Operators Yokohama perators* Yokohama
* the average of seven bus operators in and around Yokohama
the average of three railway operators operating in and around Yokohama (Keihin, Tokyu and Sotetsu)
Source: Ad-hoc Committee of Yokohama Public Transportation, T Nakajima anaysis
Other operating costs: Other operating costs in the YTB include all operating costs
except labor cost and depreciation. They should include, for example, costs for
utilities/energy, communication, and marketing. This thesis assumes that those costs
would not be reduced in the base scenario for the status-quo. In a PFP model, other
operating costs are assumed to be reduced by 10%, which is supported by the case of
the JRs (Table 5-1) for both YMSN and YMBS. Unfortunately, comparable data for a
concession model could not be obtained because the break-down of operating cost for
the comparison between pre and post privatization was not available in relevant cases.
However, given the nature of a concession model under a fixed-cost contract assumed in
this analysis, there should be a moderate impact on the reduction of other operating
costs. Therefore, this research assumes that a private contractor could achieve the same
level of cost reduction as a fully privatized company (i.e., 10% reduction) in the base
scenario.
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Table 5-7: CHANGE IN "OTHER" OPERATING COST* -JRs
(Cost per Km: Thousand JPY)
1987 1991 % Change
Repair 82 131 60%
Power 3303 -3%
Other 287 '199
Total 402 032 -1 %
Operating cost except for labor cost, Depreciation, and tax payment
Source: Fukui, et al. (1994), T. Nakajima Analysis
Interest cost: The relation between the amount of interest payment and the residual debt
discussed below is inseparable. The total interest payment in the PFP model will be
lowest if the sales proceeds of the privatized transit systems are used for debt pay-back.
This thesis assumes that all sales proceeds from private investors in the full privatization
model would indeed be used for debt pay-back. There is no difference in interest
payment between the status-quo and a concession model because the city does not
have sales proceeds to be used for debt pay-back.
Corporate Tax: In the status-quo, YTB does not have to pay corporate income tax
because it is a public entity. However, in a concession model, a private contractor needs
to pay this tax based on the net contracting fee revenue from the city. Likewise, in the
PFP model, a privatized company has to meet its corporate income tax obligation.
Although the corporate tax rate varies based on the income level, this thesis applies the
average corporate tax rate of 41% (15% and 26% for municipal and national corporate
tax rates, respectively)'6 , in all scenario for the three models.
16 See http://www.city.yokohama.ip/me/qyousei/citytax/shizei/houiin.html for Yokohama municipal corporate tax. See
also http://www.nomura.co.ip/terms/iapan/si/jikko zei.html for effective corporate tax rate in Japan.
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5.3.3 Balance Sheet Items
Capital Expenditure (CAPEX): This research assumes that in the status-quo, YTB
keeps total CAPEX at the baseline level for YMSN and YMBS in both base and
pessimistic scenario because government tends to be less sensitive to CAPEX. Indeed,
the public sector in Japan is frequently criticized as being less sensitive to CAPEX
reduction and tends to waste public funds by paying unnecessary costs. However, in the
optimistic case, even government may be able to reduce CAPEX slightly (say 5%).
Likewise, in the concession model, the baseline level would be maintained by YTB
because a private contractor by definition cannot change the CAPEX levels. However, in
the PFP model, it is reasonable to assume that a privatized company would focus on
maintenance CAPEX in order to minimize the cash outflow and maximize business value
by, for example, introducing a more competitive purchasing process or other CAPEX
reduction methods which are commonly used in the private sector. Therefore, this
research assumes a 10 % reduction of CAPEX for both YMSN and YMBS in the base
scenario. In the optimistic case, a full privatized company may reduce CAPEX more
aggressively (say an additional 5%). In contrast, in the pessimistic scenario, a privatized
company may not be able to achieve even the 10% reduction. Because CAPEX of an
infrastructure business usually has a huge impact on the entire fiscal condition of the
business, this assumption should cover a reasonable range.
Debt: In the status-quo, YTB and the city pay back the residual debt either by issuing
additional municipal bonds or using positive operating cash flow on the current pay-back
schedule, although it takes a long time to liquidate all debt. In the concession model, the
situation does not differ fundamentally from the status-quo although the amount of
interest payment can be reduced due to the increased operating cash flow, which can be
used for accelerated debt pay-back. In contrast, in the PFP model, all or a considerable
portion of the residual debt could be paid back at once by using the sales proceeds from
investors who acquire the public transit system.
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5.4 Valuation for Yokohama Municipal Subway Network (YMSN)
Based on the above assumptions, the value of each model for YMSN is quantified and
analyzed in this section. First, the value for each model is quantified. In each model,
after the value in the base scenario is calculated in detail in order to demonstrate how to
obtain the citizens' equity value, the results for the optimistic and pessimistic scenario are
presented. Finally, the difference in the business and citizens' equity value among the
three models and the three scenarios are analyzed and discussed.
5.4.1 Value of Status-quo (Public Ownership Model)
Results of Base Scenario:
Given the assumptions above, the business value of the status-quo in the base scenario
is approximately V 186 billion, the sum of the present value of annual FCF (V 8.5 billion
per year), discounted by 4.6% of WACC. After V307 billion of the predicted residual debt
as of 2007 is subtracted from this business value, the citizens' equity value is - V 122
billion (Figure 5-5).
Figure 5-5 :VALUE OF THE PUBLIC OWNERSHIP MODEL*- YMSN
(Present Value; Billion JPY)
186 -307
121
Business Debt Citizens'
Value equity
value
Base Scenario
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Results of Optimistic and Pessimistic Scenarios:
To see the range of value with different assumptions, both business and citizens' equity
values in two additional scenarios are examined. The outcome of this scenario analysis
suggests that citizens' equity value for the public ownership model is still negative (- V60
billion) even in the optimistic scenario with more relaxed assumptions, although the
business value is improved modestly to V250 billion (Table 5-8). This result implies that
the debt accumulated in YMSN is beyond the solvency capacity of YTB alone without
continuing financial assistance from the city in all cases.
Table 5-8: VALUE BY SCENARIO- PUBLIC OWNERSHIP(YMSN)
(million JPY) Scenario
"Pessimistic BASE 'Optimistic"
Business Value 151,979 185,598 249,174
Citizens' Equity -155,125 -121,506 -57,930
5.4.2 Concession Model
Result of Base Scenario
The business value of this model is V 194 billion with 4.6% of WACC and approximately
V 9 billion of annual FCF in the base scenario. Based on this business value, the citizen's
equity value of the concession model, - 4143 billion, can be obtained by making the
adjustments shown in Figure 5-6.
111
T Nakajima
Privatization of Transit in Yokohama
Figure 5-6 :VALUE OF THE CONCESSION MODEL* - YMSN
(Present Value; Billion JPY)
194 
-35 
-0
-143
Business Contrac- Debt Labor cost Subsidy Municipal Citizens'
Value tor's net transferred reduction Corporate equity
proceeds to the tax***** value
city***
Base Scenario
Assuming that Contractor's net proceeds (Contract Fee)=(the rate of returns for a contractor) x
(Operating cost before Depreciation)=15% x V 10.7 billion
Assuming 0% of existing employees would be transferred to the city's other organizations (20% labor
reduction can be achieved through natural attrition)
Assuming 0% of subsidy reduction
Assuming 15% of Municipal Tax Rate
The net contracting fee (net proceeds for a contractor after all costs are subtracted) as
well as V307 billion of debt should be subtracted from the business value. For simplicity,
this research assumes that a private contractor would seek at least the same level of
profitability as in their current operations in the most optimistic scenario (for the city).
Average operating profitability of the four railway companies operating in and around
Yokohama is 10 % in 2005. However, a private contractor is likely to seek greater
profitability in return for the risk of operating beyond its current operations. Without
additional returns, there is no reason to take such risk and spend its precious corporate
resources. Thus, for the base scenario, this research assumes 15% as the required
return for a contractor. Given that annual operating expenses except for depreciation are
approximately V10 billion in the base scenario for the concession model, the annual net
contracting fee is V 1.6 billion. As a result, the present value of this fee is V 35 billion with
WACC of 4.6% (the city pays this amount of net annual contracting fee eternally
regardless of who the contractor is).
Next, the PV of labor cost shifted to the city should be subtracted. Because the city
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announced that it would absorb all unemployed public workers except for natural
attrition'" (retirement), the additional labor cost transferred from a privatized operation
accrues to the city's account. However, given the above assumption on labor cost, there
is no more unemployment beyond natural attrition in a concession model than in the
status-quo; the PV of labor cost shifted to the city due to a concession model is therefore
zero.
Although the PV of subsidy reduction should be added back into the business value, the
PV of subsidy reduction due to privatization is zero in this case, given the above
assumptions. Thus, only the PV of the municipal corporate tax revenue should be added
back. In the concession model, the municipal corporate tax rate (15%) is charged for the
V 1.6 billion of annual net contracting fee, and approximately V 5 billion would be counted
as the PV of the municipal tax revenue. Finally, the citizens' equity value of - V143 billion
is obtained in the base scenario.
Results in the Optimistic and Pessimistic Scenarios:
Even in the optimistic scenario, similar to the public ownership model (status-quo), the
citizens' equity value is still negative (- 469 billion) (Table 5-9). The slight financial
improvement made by a contractor does not help the city solve the financial distress
caused by excessive debt for YMSN in any scenario, as discussed later.
Table 5-9: VALUE BY SCENARIO- CONCESSION (YMSN)
(million JPY) Scenario
"Pessimistic BASE 'Optimistic"
Business Value 157,400 194,416 257,992
Citizens' Equity -190,059 -142,393 -68,540
5.4.3 Publicly-controlled Full Privatization (PFP)
Result in Base Scenario:
Based on the above assumptions, the business value in a publicly-controlled full
17 The city has adopted 60 year old retirement system
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privatization (PFP) model would be approximately V 140 billion in the base scenario. By
adjusting this business value through the following process, approximately V 15 billion of
the citizens' equity value is obtained (Figure 5-7).
From the business value, V307 billion of debt should first be subtracted. Likewise,
approximately V 2 billion should be subtracted as the PV of labor cost transferred to the
city. For estimating the impact of the labor transferred from a privatized company to the
city, the same assumption used in the valuation of the concession model is applied. To
minimize the labor cost shifted to the city, this research assumes that the city would allow
the private contractor to transfer laid-off employees based on seniority. In addition to the
employees who retire through natural attrition, the lay-off of 88 workers who are
supposed to work at most for 4 years is assumed 8, resulting in the PV19 of the labor cost
shifted to the city is approximately V 2 billion.
Figure 5-7 :VALUE OF THE PFP MODEL* - YMSN
(Present Value; Billion JPY)
140 -307
all+103 15
+18
-2
Business Debt Labor cost Int. Subsidy Municipal Citizens'
Value transferred Payment reduction Corporate equity
to the saving tax**** value
city**
Base Scenario
Assuming approximately 90 existing employees would be transferred to the city's other organizations
Assuming 100% of subsidy reduction
Assuming 15% of Municipal Tax Rate
The city can save approximately V 18 billion of interest payment because the city can pay
18 Estimate based on the material provided in interviews with Yokohama city officials in Jan. 18, 2007
19 This is not perpetuity-based Pv because all the transferred workers will be retired in 4 years with an attrition rate of
20%; the city thus does not have to pay them salary forever.
114
T. Nakajima
Privatization of Transit in Yokohama
back V 140 billion of the V307 billion estimated total residual debt (as of 2007E) at once,
using the paid-in cash from a private purchaser. In the status-quo case, it would take 7
years to pay back this amount of debt with the assumption that the city annually pays
back V30 billion with a 4.78 % interest rate and the same amount of principal. Note that
the discount rate used to calculate the PV of interest payment saving is not WACC but a
4.78% interest rate simply because the risk associated with the debt obligation is unique
to the city, not to the business itself after the privatization.
In addition, the following items should be added to the business value. Approximately
V 63 billion of subsidy reduction impact should be added, because the city would no
longer support YMSN through subsidy after full privatization. Finally, the PV of the
corporate tax revenue should also be added. Given V 5 billion of municipal corporate tax
revenue is expected annually, the PV of this tax revenue is approximately V 103 billion.
Finally, Y1 5 billion of the citizens' equity value is obtained in the base scenario.
Results in Optimistic and Pessimistic Scenarios:
In the optimistic scenario, the citizens' equity value is improved significantly (V 111 billion)
due to the improvement in business value, the municipal tax revenue increase, and
interest payment reduction (Table 5-10). In particular, the additional 5% increase in
ridership greatly contributes to the increase in business value because of its sensitivity to
the value. However, in the pessimistic scenario, even in this model, the citizens' equity
value becomes negative (- V77 billion), although this value is still higher than the citizens'
equity value generated by either the public ownership or concession model in the base
scenario.
Table 5-10: VALUE BY SCENARIO- PFP (YMSN)
(million JPY) Scenario
"Pessimistic BASE 'Optimistic"
Business Value 80,768 140,396 200,024
Citizens' Equity -77,120 14,858 111,149
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5.4.4 Analysis
The valuation for YMSN indicates that the business value of the PFP model is smaller
than those of the status-quo and the concession model (Figure 5-8) in the three
scenarios. This somewhat counterintuitive result can be attributed to the following
reasons. First, while the business value of the status-quo and the concession model
includes the subsidies (i.e., the value transferred from the city), the business value of a
PFP model does not. Second, the other two models have a tax advantage over the PFP
model simply because a public organization is exempt from corporate tax. Although a
private contractor needs to pay tax on its net contract proceeds, government itself does
not have to pay it. In Japan, approximately 41% of net income of a profit-seeking
company is paid as corporate tax to the central and local governments. Therefore, even
though a privatized operator could improve financial aspects compared with the YTB, the
enhanced value of such improvements would be offset by the value lost via newly
charged corporate tax in the YMSN case.
Figure 5-8 :BUSINESS VALUE OF THE THREE MODELS* - YMSN
(Present Value; Billion JPY)
194
186 (+8) 140
(-46)
Status-quo Concession Publicly-
controlled full
privatization
Base Scenario
In terms of the citizens' equity value, the PFP model is the best option in all scenarios;
only a PFP model has a positive citizens' equity value in both base and optimistic
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scenarios. In the base scenario, an additionally V 136 billion could be generated by
switching from the public ownership model to the PFP model (Figure 5-9). Even
comparing the PFP model in the pessimistic scenario with the other two models in the
base scenario, the PFP model generates the largest citizens' equity value (Figure 5-10).
Figure 5-9: CITIZENS' EQUITY VALUE OF THE THREE MODELS - YMSN
(Present Value; Billion JPY)
Status-quo vs. Concession Status-quo vs. PFP
Publicly-
Value controlled Full Value
Status-quo Concession Created Status-quo Privatization Created
15 +136
121 -121
-142
Base Scenario
In contrast, by switching from the status-quo to the concession model, the citizens' equity
value is worsened in any scenarios examined in this research. This is mainly because a
significant portion of value created under this model will leak to a private contractor
through the net contractor's proceeds. The additional business value (Y 8 billion in the
base scenario) created by switching from the status-quo to this model is smaller than the
value leaked (Y 35 billion in the base scenario) to a private contractor. To make matters
worse, the city cannot expect as large a subsidy reduction and corporate tax revenue in a
concession model as in a PFP model. In sum, from city's and citizens' perspective, there
is no financial rationale to switch to the concession model from the status-quo.
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Figure 5-10: VALUE RANGE BETWEEN "OPTIMISTIC" AND
"PESSIMISTIC" SCENARIO-YMSN
(Present Value; Billion JPY)
Business Value by Model Citizens' Equity Value by Model
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5.5 Valuation for Yokohama Municipal Bus System (YMBS)
Similar to YMSN, based on the above assumptions, the value of each model for YMBS
are quantified and analyzed in this section. First, the value for each model is quantified.
In each model, after the value in the base scenario is calculated in detail in order to
demonstrate how to obtain the citizens' equity value, the results for the optimistic and
pessimistic scenario are presented. Finally, the difference in the business and citizens'
equity value among the three models and the three scenarios are analyzed and
discussed.
5.5.1 Value of Status-quo (Public Ownership Model)
Result of Base Scenario:
The business value of the status-quo of YMBS is - V1.3 billion in the base scenario based
on the stated assumptions. From this business value, approximately V 5 billion debt
should be subtracted, resulting in the citizens' equity value of - V 6.3 billion (Figure 5-11).
The business value becomes negative (before any adjustment) because of the subsidy
reduction planned by the city. In other words, the current positive business value under
public ownership does not represent the true business value solely from operation; it is
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inflated byfinancial support from the city (and citizens).
Figure 5-11 :VALUE OF THE PUBLIC OWNERSHIP MODEL* - YMBS
(Present Value; Billion JPY)
-1
Business
Value
-5
-6
Debt Citizens'
equity
value
* Base Scenario
Results in Optimistic and Pessimistic Scenarios:
In the optimistic scenario, both business and citizens' equity value are improved
significantly and become positive (Table 5-11). Given that other key metrics including
average salary and the number of employees remain the same as in the base scenario,
the 5 % ridership increase assumed in this scenario contributes greatly to this
improvement. In the pessimistic scenario where the ridership is assumed to decrease by
5%, both values decrease significantly.
Table 5-11: VALUE BY SCENARIO- PUBLIC OWNERSHIP
Business Value
Scenario
"Pessimistic" BASE
-27,350 -1,330
"Optimistic"
32,054
Citizens' Equity Value -32,462 -6,442 26,942
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5.5.2 Value of Concession Model
Result of Base Scenario:
The business value in the concession model is Y 9 billion, V 10 billion higher than the
status-quo mainly due to the assumed cost reductions. The V 5 billion of debt as well as
the PV of the contractor's net proceeds, which is Y 58 billion, should be subtracted from
the business value (Figure 5-12).
In calculating the contractor's net proceeds, the same logic used for YMSN above is
employed. The average operating profitability among the three private bus operators
examined is approximately 5%. Thus, in the most optimistic scenario (for the city), it is
assumed that a private contractor seeks the same profitability. However, a private
contractor is more likely to seek additional return to compensate for its business risk of
going beyond its traditional operation. Therefore, this research conservatively assumes a
10% rate of return for a private contractor in the base scenario.
Even with this lower rate of return, the absolute value of the annual net contractor's
proceeds is different between YMSN and YMBS simply due to the difference in operating
cost (excluding depreciation) between these two systems, V11 billion and V22 billion,
respectively. This is why the present value of the contractor's net proceed in YMBS (Y 58
billion) is larger than that in YMSN (V 35 billion). Because the FCF (Y 0.33 billion) for
YMBS is far below the contractors' annual net proceeds (Y 3.2 billion), the PV of the
proceeds is also much larger than the business value of YMBS. This paradoxical
situation does not occur in YMSN because additional FCF generated by a private
contractor is far larger than its net proceeds.
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Figure 5-12 :VALUE OF THE CONCESSION MODEL* - YMBS
(Present Value; Billion JPY)
9 -58
0 0 +13-
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Value tor's net transferred reduction Corporate equity
proceeds to the tax***** value
** city***
* Base Scenario
Assuming that Contractor's annual net proceeds (Contract Fee)=(the rate of returns for a contractor) x(Operating cost before Depreciation) = 10% x V 21.9 billion
Assuming 0% of existing employees would be transferred to the city's other organizations (20% labor
reduction can be achieved through natural attrition)
Assuming 0% of subsidy reduction
*Assuming 15% of Municipal Tax Rate
Finally, the following items should be adjusted. The PV of the labor cost shifted to the city
is zero, because there is no additional unemployment compared with the status-quo.
Similarly, the impact of subsidy reduction due to privatization is zero, given the
assumption that YTB would cut subsidies the same amount as in the status-quo (i.e., no
additional saving from privatization). Finally, the PV of municipal corporate tax from a
private contractor (V 13 billion) should be added back to the business value. As a result,
the citizens' equity value in this model is - V 41 billion.
Results in Optimistic and Pessimistic Scenarios:
Similar to the scenarios in the public ownership model, any change in ridership affects
both business and citizens' equity value greatly, given that business value is not highly
sensitive to the change in advertising fee, other operating cost, or CAPEX, all of which
are assumed to change in both optimistic and pessimistic scenarios (Table 5-12).
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Table 5-12: VALUE BY SCENARIO -CONCESSION(YMBS)
Senal io
"Pessinistic" BASE "Optimistic"
-22,348 8,673 42,056
Senar)io
"Pessimistic" BASE "Optinistic"
-126,399 -70,005 21,947
5.5.3 Value of Publicly-controlled Full Privatization
Result of Base Scenario:
Based on the stated assumptions, a citizens' equity value of approximately Y 113 is
obtained in a publicly-controlled full privatization (Figure 5-13). The business value of
YMBS in this model is V 59 billion. As in the concession model, V 5 billion of debt should
be subtracted. In addition, the PV of the labor cost transferred to the city, which is V 1.3
billion, should be subtracted from the business value. In the base scenario of the PFP
model, 73 employees are dismissed in addition to the natural attrition of the same
number of employees,2 0 which is assumed in other two models. These dismissed
employees are assumed to work for 4 years at most (a 25% annual attrition rate),
resulting in V 1.3 billion of the PV if the city accepts these dismissed employees.
Next the following items should be added back. First, V 0.2 billion of the PV of the saved
interest payment should be added. Since the estimated residual debt for YMBS in 2007 is
only Y 5 billion which is much smaller than that for YMSN, the simulation shows that the
city could pay back all debt by 2011 if it pays back the current levels of principal payment
constantly. This is why the impact of saved interest payment is much smaller in YMBS
than for YMSN. Next, given the assumption that subsidies are reduced by 10% in the
PFP model compared with the public ownership, the PV of the subsidy reduction due to
privatization is Y 7 billion. Finally, the PV of the municipal corporate tax revenue from a
privatized company should be added. With the same assumptions as for YMSN, the PV
of the municipal corporate tax would be Y 53 billion.
2 Estimated based on the material provided by government officials at the interview in Jan. 18, 2007
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Figure 5-13 :VALUE OF THE PFP MODEL* - YMBS
(Present Value; Billion JPY)
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Assuming 100% of subsidy reduction
Assuming 15% of Municipal Tax Rate
Results in Optimistic and Pessimistic Scenarios:
Table 5-13 shows that both business and citizens' equity values of the PFP model are
positive even in the pessimistic scenario. In addition to the ridership increase, the key
factor contributing to the wide range of value between the pessimistic and optimistic
scenario is the combination of the change in the number of employees by 3% and
change in average salary by 5%, resulting in 226% change in the business value, ceteris
paribus.
Table 5-13: VALUE BY SCENARIO -PFP (YMBS)
(million JPY) Senario
"Pessimistic" BASE "optimistic"
10,903 58,831 105,824
Senario
"Pessimistic" BASE "Optimistic"
39,696 112,234 182,601
5.5.4 Analysis
There is a significant difference in business value between the PFP model and the other
two models (5-14). This difference can be attributed mainly to the difference in labor cost
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reduction. In YMBS, labor cost represents 90% of all operating cost. Therefore, the
business value is highly sensitive to change in the salary levels and the number of
employees. The combination of an additional 3% reduction in the number of employees
and 5% decrease in the average salary leads to approximately V 2 billion higher FCF (i.e.,
V52 billion of the PV) than other two models. Although the additional 10% decrease in
subsidy aggravates the FCF of the PFP model, the 10% ridership increase assumed only
for the PFP model in the base scenario offsets such FCF decrease. Although there is a
corporate tax disadvantage in this model, unlike the YMSN case, the FCF after tax
generated by this model is much more than the total FCF generated in the other two
models.
In all scenarios examined above, the PFP model is the best option financially among the
three models in terms of the citizens' equity value. Only the PFP model has a positive
citizens' equity value in the base scenario. Even comparing the PFP model in the
pessimistic scenario with other two models in the optimistic setting, the citizens' equity
value of the PFP model is still the largest (Figure 5-15).
Figure 5-14 :BUSINESS VALUE OF THE THREE MODELS* - YMBS
(Present Value; Billion JPY)
59(+60
9
Status-quo Concession Publicly-
controlled full
privatization
Base Scenario
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Figure 5-15: VALUE RANGE BETWEEN "OPTIMISTIC" AND
"PESSIMISTIC" SCENARIO-YMBS
(Present Value; Billion JPY)
Business Value by Model
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50 42
-27 -22
-50 Status-quo Concession PFP
Citizens' Equity Value by Model
-126
Status-quo Concession PFP
Shifting from the status-quo to a concession model, the city could lose $ 35 billion (Figure
5-18). Although the FCF (business value) can be enhanced, most value created by this
model would be transferred to a private contractor through the contractor's net proceeds.
As already discussed, the annual net proceeds (V 3.2 billion) paid out to the contractor is
far beyond the FCF (V 0.33 billion) generated under this model. To make matters worse,
the municipal corporate tax revenue from the contractor is not as significant as from a
fully privatized entity. In sum, similar to YMSN, there is no financial rationale to apply the
concession model in YMBS.
In contrast, the shift from the status-quo to a PFP model would generate an additional
V 119 billion for Yokohama. This large impact can be explained by the larger business
value of a PFP model due to the improved labor cost, to which business value is highly
sensitive. In addition, this considerably improved net income would produce a large
municipal corporate tax revenue which cannot be expected in the status-quo.
125
T Nakajima
Privatization of Transit in Yokohama T. Nakajima
Figure 5-16: CITIZENS' EQUITY VALUE OF THE THREE MODELS -YMBS
(Present Value; Billion JPY)
Status-quo vs. Concession Status-quo vs. PFP
Publicly-
Value controlled Full Value
Status-quo Concession Created Status-quo Privatization Created
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5.6 Concluding remarks- Integration of social and financial analyses
In other studies of the impacts of privatization, researchers have tended to focus on
individual financial metrics for the privatized entity alone. However, as this chapter has
discussed, the financial value of privatization should be examined from the perspective of
a selling government and ultimately its citizens. The financial impact of privatization
should also be measured using a holistic valuation framework rather than individual
metrics. This chapter recommends the perpetuity-based valuation method and
framework to quantify the total financial impact of privatization from the perspective of a
privatizing city and ultimately its citizens - "citizens' equity value."
Based on the analysis using the suggested valuation method, the PFP model is the most
financially attractive option both for YMSN and YMBS among the three models examined
in this chapter; the financial value for Yokohama created by the PFP model is largest
among the three models. As already discussed, for YMSN, the citizens' equity value of
the PFP even in the pessimistic scenario is larger than that for the public ownership or
concession model in the base scenario. Likewise, for YMBS, the citizens' equity value of
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the PFP model in all scenarios is positive and larger than those of the other two models in
all scenarios examined. Given these results, the City of Yokohama should choose the
PFP model in order to maximize the citizens' equity value. However, note that this
analysis does not incorporate the impact of retained governmental control over a
privatized transit service on the financial value at least explicitly, although some
assumptions reflect this impact implicitly (for example, the assumption of the 0% fare
increase reflecting governmental regulation assumed for fare revision). The sales
proceeds from private investors would be discounted if government signals its readiness
to intervene with a privatized entity simply because managerial freedom for the entity is
limited.
A financially effective option is not necessarily a socially effective option. Even when the
citizens' equity (financial) value is maximized, social risks caused by privatization are not
necessarily minimized, although the maximization of citizens' equity value should
contribute to better social welfare in a general sense as discussed above. The results of
social impact and risk analysis in the previous chapter however do not support the
argument that privatization affects social welfare negatively. Rather, privatization
combined with appropriate governmental interventions can improve service quality, safety,
and even employment while at the same time keeping fare levels socially reasonable. If a
privatized entity can deliver better transit service with lower cost without significant social
risks and if the citizens' equity value can be improved, there is no reason to block
publicly-controlled full privatization.
Indeed, relinquishing public ownership of transit systems is a critically important public
policy decision because ownership transfer is usually an irreversible process. Once
public ownership is lost, the public control over a given asset might be severely
weakened. For example, the introduction of new technology for public transit might be
delayed by a privatized entity in order to save CAPEX and maximize profits. Likewise, the
extension or upgrade of a transit system might be deferred by a profit seeking company
even when the public strongly desires it. In fact, private operators are more cost
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conscious and attempt to minimize expenses in the interest of profit maximization. In the
worst scenario, a privatized entity might encounter financial distress (i.e., go bankrupt),
and significant financial and social costs would be ultimately incurred by a privatizing city;
the city would need to take over the transit operation and networks in order to ensure
continuous transit service provision for the public. Indeed, there are such cases in the
history of public transit even in developed nations (e.g. the nationalization of railway
networks in the UK in 1948), although the default risk of public transit companies
particularly in Japan, which can expect relatively stable cash flow, should be much lower
than other businesses (Damodaran, 2006) (this is why the betas and WACCs of
comparable transit companies are relatively low21).
However, these arguments frequently do not have convincing bases and are based on
intuitive fears against privatization. The facts examined in this research suggest that
private companies attempt to improve the service quality and to meet the public needs
while at the same time improving their fiscal condition. This is because private operators
know that they can increase their profits by increasing customer satisfaction, particularly
when the operators see potential threats from competitors.
In addition, as already discussed, public control and ownership are discrete concepts;
government can retain control over privatized transit systems through effectively
designed regulatory or corporate governance mechanisms as discussed in the following
chapter. Through these mechanisms, government can control a privatized entity and
prevent the above arguments and concerns from being realizing. Government can, for
example, facilitate private investments in new technology adoption either through
contracts or subsidies (as the London Bus case suggests) or through the
post-privatization corporate governance mechanism. Likewise, government can monitor
and, if necessary, intervene with the financial management of a privatized entity in a
timely and appropriate manner particularly through the corporate governance
mechanisms before financial distress results.
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Furthermore, there is no guarantee that government or a public enterprise is more
financially and operationally responsible for and capable of transit service provision than
private operators, as many cases including JNR suggest. For example, in many
developed nations, publicly-owned transit systems are outdated because of the limited
financial capacity of public authorities. Furthermore, some municipal governments
declare bankruptcy (particularly in the US). Few people from other developed nations can
therefore believe that the public sector is more responsible and capable of more
sophisticated public transit service delivery than the private sector, particularly when
considering the public transit systems in the US, most of which are owned and operated
by the public sector. Integrating the analytic results and discussion from this chapter with
those from the previous chapter, this research therefore suggests the PFP model as the
most effective model for Yokohama and possibly for other municipalities in Japan.
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Chapter 6: Summary and Conclusion
This chapter summarizes the key findings from this research. Based on the results of this
research, this chapter provides recommendations with some practical suggestions, on
which managerial model (among public ownership plus the three privatization models)
the City of Yokohama should choose for its public transit systems. More general
implications and recommendations for other municipalities particularly in developed
nations will also be discussed. Finally, this chapter addresses issues which should be
explored in further research.
6.1 Summary
Privatization, the process by which government transfers, partially or entirely, its
ownership of public assets to the private sector has been a buzz word for the last three
decades. However, privatization arguments particularly in the field of public transportation
either by proponents or opponents have not been comprehensive and frequently lack
convincing supporting evidence. Some support privatization by emphasizing the financial
benefits to privatized companies. Others criticize privatization by arguing that a privatized
company will sacrifice the public interest for profit or shareholders' interest. However,
holistic arguments accompanying evidence based on both social and financial
perspectives have rarely been presented.
The privatization argument for municipally-owned public transit networks in Yokohama is
no exception. Due to high municipal debt and problematic financial conditions of the
Yokohama Municipal Subway Network (YMSN) and Yokohama Municipal Bus Service
(YMBS), Mayor Nakada established the Ad-hoc Committee of Public Transportation
(Ad-hoc Committee) in order to evaluate the potential of privatization for the two systems.
The Ad-hoc Committee recommended that the city should privatize the two systems to
overcome financial problems by following an IPO scheme. However, the Yokohama
Transportation Bureau (YTB) has not responded decisively to the recommendation and
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may intend to maintain the status-quo even without presenting convincing counter
arguments. Similar to privatization arguments in other cases around the world, both
parties seem to represent specific interests and have not provided comprehensive
arguments reflecting not just the financial perspective but also the social perspective.
Another problem in the privatization argument is that privatization is frequently
commingled with deregulation, although deregulation and privatization are logically
distinct concepts. Privatization refers to the degree of private ownership. Although many
variations of privatization exist, these variations can practically be categorized into two
groups: privatized operation and full privatization . In contrast, deregulation refers to the
drastic reduction or elimination of governmental control or influence. Even in the case of
full privatization, government can retain control over privatized assets and operation
through regulation.
Based on these two distinct dimensions - the degrees of privatization and deregulation,
three privatization models are introduced in addition to the public ownership model. The
concession model refers to the privatization case in which government transfers only its
operation rights to the private sector and retains prior regulatory control over the
operation. The second privatization model is a publicly-controlled full privatization in
which government relinquishes both asset ownership and operation rights but maintains
its control and influence over privatized assets and operation. The final privatization
model is market-oriented full privatization in which government substantially relinquishes
its regulatory power and ownership.
Based on the case analysis, social influence and risk caused by privatization were
analyzed among the three models identified. More specifically, five major issues which
are frequently raised as reasons to oppose privatization were examined in terms of their
applicability to the actual cases of each model: (1) fare increases (2) worsened service
22 Although asset-transfer privatization in which only asset ownership is transferred from a government to private
operators could be the third option, the actual case of asst-transfer privatization is rarely observed in the public
transportation arena
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quality, (3) lower safety, (4) abandonment or dilution of socially necessary routes, and (5)
lay-offs and worsened labor conditions. The quantitative and qualitative analysis did not
find evidence that privatization in the three models examined in this research is strongly
subject to these five issues except fare increases which are observed in the UK local bus,
the case of market-oriented full privatization. In other words, whether the public concerns
become real depends not on privatization itself but on the degree of deregulation;
government should continue to retain control over the transit system even after full
privatization. Considering strong public concerns or skepticism about privatization, this
thesis therefore suggests that market-oriented full privatization should be avoided in
order to minimize the risk of fare increase by a privatized entity.
A comprehensive financial valuation framework and method are introduced to evaluate
the financial value of the three models -public ownership, concession, and PFP- and
analyze the financial impact of privatization from the perspective of a city and its citizens
by applying the financial data in the Yokohama case. Given the fact that public assets
ultimately belong to tax payers (citizens), the value created by the privatization should be
analyzed from their perspectives. More specifically, post-privatization financial impact
should be analyzed not only by examining the fiscal improvement in a privatized
company but by reflecting the impact on tax revenue, subsidies, municipal debt
obligations, and other financial items influenced by privatization. To quantify the financial
impact of privatization, the perpetuity-based Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) method is
applied. Given assumptions established in this research, this thesis found that
publicly-controlled full privatization is the most financially attractive option among the
three models examined.
6.2 Recommendations for the City of Yokohama
Based on the results of the analysis conducted in this research, this thesis suggests that
the City of Yokohama should privatize both YMSN and YSBS following a PFP model.
Publicly-controlled full privatization can maximize the citizens' equity value and protect
the public interest. As the cases of SMRT, London Bus, and Japan Rails show, even in
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full privatization, general social concerns about privatization (i.e., malpractice or
excessive profit-seeking behavior sacrificing the public interest) do not have to result
from applying the PFP model.
Going beyond the model selection, the city needs to design a specific scheme for the
implementation of privatization. The following specific issues should be considered in
designing such a scheme.
6.2.1 Combination or Separation
The question of whether the city should privatize YMSN and YMBS as an integrated
entity or separate entities is one of the key issues to be considered in designing a
concrete privatization scheme, although neither the Ad-hoc Committee nor YTB
discussed this. The answer to this question depends on the synergy between the two
businesses. If financial and operating synergies would result if the two networks are
owned and operated jointly, the city should privatize them as a single entity.
Revenue synergy might exist when passengers would be more likely to use each network
because of, for example, the unified service standards and coordinated service provision.
Because a unified service planning process between the two networks is required to
capture such revenue synergy, operation by a single entity is typically desirable. However,
if the government continues to take a major role in a coordinated planning process as is
the case in London where TfL controls both bus and underground services, unified
service standards and coordinated service provision between the two networks could be
maintained even if the two networks are privatized separately.
Cost synergy could result due to economies of scale. Administrative (overhead) cost per
unit could be reduced because the two networks can share such costs. However, other
operating cost synergies might not be generated from the consolidated operation of the
two networks simply because of the different nature of operations. Drivers cannot be
shared between the two networks because the skill required for one network is totally
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different from that for the other. Procurement costs may not decrease due to the
significant differences between the two networks as well. Therefore, much operating cost
synergy from the integrated operation should not be expected even when the two
systems are operated and owned by a single profit-seeking company.
Given a PFP model in which the city continues to play a significant role. in planning
service provision and setting operational standards for the two networks, the two
networks therefore do not necessarily have to be privatized as a single entity.
6.2.2 Privatization Scheme
The city needs to select a specific form of privatization by addressing the following two
questions. First, how many companies should operate the privatized transit service? The
city could transfer its assets and operation rights to either a single succeeding company
or multiple companies. Second, how should the city transfer its assets and operation
rights to succeeding entities? Should the city sell the assets and operation rights directly
to private investors or existing companies (i.e., trade sales)? Or, should the city
corporatize the assets and operation of YMSN and YMBS and sell their stock to private
investors via the public security market (i.e., IPO)?
a) Single vs. multiple companies
The number of entities to which the city transfers its ownership of public transit systems
critically influences the degree of competition (the more operators, the more competition).
However, competition itself does not necessarily guarantee economic efficiency
particularly for a fixed infrastructure like a subway network. The multiple operators and
competition among them over a single small fixed network would rather tend to decrease
the economic efficiency. On the other hand, the operation and ownership of such an
infrastructure by a single entity would enhance the risk of a natural monopoly. However,
given the fact that YMSN is already facing competition from private railway companies
operating in and around Yokohama, such monopoly risk should be low. If a privatized
YMSN would increase fare levels unfairly by leveraging its monopolistic power, many
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passengers could relatively easily switch to the competing railway networks. More
importantly, strict regulatory controls such as the yardstick competition approach would
not allow a privatized single company to leverage its monopolistic power. Therefore, it is
not socially risky for the city to transfer its ownership to a single privatized entity in order
to maximize the efficiency gained from scale.
Unlike YMSN, the city should transfer its ownership of YMBS to multiple companies for
the following reasons. First, because a bus system does not depend on fixed
infrastructure, bus routes can be changed flexibly to increase efficiency through
competition. Second, the economic advantage from the scale of network is limited
compared with a rail network. Cowie and Asenova showed that the increasing returns to
the scale can be observed up to E11.1 million in terms of revenue in the UK local bus
industry (1999). As this study shows, there is no scale advantage provided by a single
dominant operator of an entire regional bus system like YMBS. In sum, as many cases
including London Bus and the UK local bus service suggest, the advantages of
competition outweigh any scale economies in promoting efficiency for a monopoly.
b) Technical Option of Full Privatization
Although full privatization (i.e., transfer of operation rights and asset ownership) can take
a variety of forms in practice, a trade sale (or direct sale) and Initial Public Offering (IPO)
are the most common forms of full privatization particularly in public transportation.
The case of London Bus can be categorized as a trade sale scheme because TfL sold
the assets of London Bus Ltd to private investors, for example, through Management
Buy-Out (MBO). Government typically establishes an open bidding process and allows
private investors, who can meet prerequisites established by the government, to
participate in the process. A trade sale process is simple and costless compared with an
IPO. However, because the winner takes it all and has a strong competitive advantage
over losers after the bidding process, competitive fairness is a key issue in a trade sale
scheme.
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In contrast, in an IPO, asset ownership is openly distributed to private investors through
the stock market. In an IPO, government first corporatizes the operation and assets of a
public transit system; government transfers asset ownership and operation rights to the
newly established profit-seeking entity. Then, government sells all or part of the stock of
this entity through a public stock offering. The case of the Japan Railways is a typical
example of an IPO. Because the shares of a privatized entity are traded in an open stock
market, an IPO seems fairer than a trade sale scheme. Furthermore, because a
privatizing government can gradually relinquish its ownership by selling the stock of a
privatized entity, government can observe and correct the behavior and performance of a
privatized entity.
In addition, through initial stock pricing and gradual stock sales, government can also
send clear political signals to citizens and investors. Government, which commits to
existing policies supporting privatization, tends to underprice the share price in an IPO
and to retain a considerable portion of equity over time because the share price would
drop (i.e., the residual equity value retained by government would be eroded) if
government changes its privatization policy (Perotti and Guney, 1993, Perotti 1995,
Bortolotti, 2001, and Megginson et al., 2004). If government sells shares at once at a
higher price, investors would interpret such government behavior as evidence that
government may change its policy unfavorably for the privatized company after the
one-shot share sales (Perroti/Guney, 1993). Underpricing an IPO also effectively attracts
wider participation in the capital market from the middle class, whose votes are critical for
a pro-privatization government (Bortolotti et al, 2000 and 2003, and Megginson et al,
2001). However, the critical disadvantage of an IPO is the high cost associated with an
IPO process itself. A privatizing government needs to pay large fees to investment banks
for issuing stock and arranging an IPO. Therefore, an IPO scheme is not suitable for a
relatively small scale privatization.
This thesis recommends an IPO scheme for the full privatization of YMSN although IPO
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is more costly than a trade sale scheme in implementation. IPO-based full privatization is
more likely to protect the public interest and discourage a privatized entity from
leveraging its monopolistic power than a trade sale scheme as long as the city retains a
significant equity portion or a "golden share" of the privatized entity as discussed in the
following section. By showing the continuing involvement of the city through equity
sharing, the city might also alleviate the social concerns or public opposition to
privatization. IPO-based full privatization is also a better option for competitive fairness
than a trade sale scheme because the assets already built by the city would not be
transferred to any existing private companies; privatization would not affect the relative
position of all existing transit operators.
Unlike the full privatization of YMSN, this thesis recommends that the city apply a trade
sale for full privatization of YMBS. As discussed earlier, YMBS could be transferred to
multiple companies because the limited monopoly risks and the absence of significant
scale economies. In contrast, an IPO would be unfavorable simply because it is too costly
to let multiple privatized entities develop through an IPO scheme. Although there would
be a concern with fairness in a trade sale, it can be alleviated by a carefully designed
bidding process, particularly when assets are transferred to multiple companies as in the
London Bus case. The city could, for example, sell assets (buses and other hardware) to
multiple private companies and award them the operation rights for each route through a
separate tendering process.
6.2.3 Governmental Control
As stated repeatedly, the city should retain or even reinforce its role and regulatory power
over the two privatized public transit networks in order to protect the public interest and
alleviate social concerns about privatization. At the same time, the city should collaborate
with other major cities in Japan and work to influence the central government to maintain
its current regulations such as the yardstick competition approach for public
transportation companies.
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In addition to traditional regulatory approaches, the city should have several means to
control the privatized networks. For YMSN, the city should design a control mechanism
through corporate governance. The city can control the privatized companies by retaining
a significant portion of shareholders' equity. If the city retains 33.4% of shareholders'
equity, the city can have veto power over key managerial decisions of a privatized
company. Using a veto, the city can prevent the privatized YMSN from behaving contrary
to the public interest. The city can control the privatized YMSN by issuing a "golden
share" as in many privatization cases in the UK during Thatcher's regime. A golden share
is a stock with a veto over major managerial decisions of a company. Owning only one
golden share provides strong control power over a company for government. The range
of a veto can be specified in articles of incorporation.
For YMBS, the city should embed the control mechanism in a tendering process and
contract with private operators as in the case of London Bus. The service standards and
contract price levels can be stipulated in a request for proposal. However, as many cases
show, private contractors frequently attempt to increase the contract price and do not
follow the service standards which are stipulated in a contract once they win a contract
with government, particularly when the government depends on a single operator. In
such a situation, it is difficult for the city to control a contractor because government
cannot easily switch a contractor to another. Therefore, to decrease the negotiation
power of existing contractors and ensure their compliance with a contract, the city should
also shorten the contract length. In this way, the city could discourage private bus
operators to whom the city transfers asset ownership and operation rights for YMBS.
6.3 General Implications
Although the result of financial impact analysis will vary according to the specific fiscal
conditions of the municipality and its transit services, there are still general
recommendations which can be drawn from this research for other municipalities in
Japan and other developed nations.
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First, in privatizing public transit services, government should retain its control over the
privatized services either through traditional regulatory schemes or corporate
governance mechanisms such as issuing a golden share. As repeatedly stated,
privatization and deregulation are distinct concepts; and government cannot and should
not escape from its responsibility to protect the public interest with respect to public
transit services even after privatization. In successful cases of full privatization including
London Bus, Singapore's MRT system, and Japan National Rails, government continues
to play a significant role in planning and controlling privatized entities and their service
delivery.
However, as already mentioned, retaining or reinforcing existing governmental control
over a privatized service is likely to lower the sales value of a given transit system.
Private investors are reluctant to invest in the business in which their managerial freedom
is limited by the public interventions. For example, issuing a golden share would
decrease the sales price of assets simply because other shareholders would prefer not to
have government maintain such powerful influence over their companies through only a
single share. In addition, investors might interpret a golden share as evidence that
government would not like a privatized entity to be radically reformed by private
participants (Damodaran, 2002). Retaining a significant portion of equity share of a
privatized entity literally means that government cannot capture all business value
assumed by private investors simply because government does not sell all the equity
shares to the private investors. Governmental interventions which does not allow a
privatized entity from exiting from unprofitable routes or to lay off existing labor might
decrease the sales value significantly because the room to improve the fiscal condition of
acquired assets is limited and meaningful improvement in cash flow (therefore, business
value) cannot be expected. In sum, government needs to choose an optimal point at
which the social risk potentially caused by privatization is minimized and financial value is
maximized given the social risk levels, in the trade-off between the degrees of
deregulation and privatization.
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Second, by retaining governmental control, government can privatize its public transit
service in order to improve service standards and operational efficiency if government
alone cannot achieve these objectives. Government or the public transit authority alone
tends to neglect improving service and efficiency for bureaucratic reasons and lack of
incentive or discipline. In fact, as all cases examined in this research show, performance
measurements including service quality and safety have generally improved significantly
after privatization. At least, government should continue to use the threat of privatization
with the transit authority by clearly stating that government will privatize transit services if
the authority alone cannot improve operations. Indeed, the strong pressure from Mayor
Nakada and his Ad-hoc Committee has worked effectively to force YTB to reform itself
although the impact of the reform is still not sufficient.
Third, the financial impact of privatization should be examined not from the perspective of
a privatized company but from a privatizing government and ultimately its citizens (i.e.,
based on the citizens' equity value). In many studies, the impact of individual metrics, not
total value, is examined, and financial benefits of privatization for a privatized company,
not for the government or its citizens, is argued. However, because the privatization of
public transportation affects municipal welfare greatly, a comprehensive financial analysis
from the city's perspective should be conducted before a privatization decision. The
public assets ultimately belong to citizens. Therefore, government is responsible for
maximizing the financial value of assets and sales proceeds from private investors in
selling the assets; government should not give citizens' assets as a free gift to the private
sector as occurred in the London Bus case.
6.4 Further research
This research provided a holistic analysis of the privatization of a public transit system by
integrating the social and financial perspectives and examining the case of Yokohama.
Based on the analysis conducted, this thesis suggests an effective privatization model of
a municipal public transit system that alleviates the social concerns about privatization
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and maximizes the financial value for the public. However, there are several areas to be
explored through further research.
Reinforce the social impacts of privatization: More cases for each privatization
model in developed nations should be identified and analyzed to establish more solid
general conclusions about effective privatization models, although this research
examined major privatization cases for public transit. In particular, the US cases of a
concession model should be more rigorously analyzed from the social perspective. In
addition, the cases examined in this research should be analyzed more deeply in
order to illuminate or exclude the influence from factors other than privatization itself.
Further research needs to show whether, for example, improvements in service
quality and safety levels after privatization were achieved mainly through privatization
or through other factors.
Conduct more solid financial simulation: There are several areas to be reinforced
in the financial impact analysis. Although this research employed the perpetuity
valuation method to examine the financial impact of privatization, this method tends
to overestimate financial value as mentioned in Chapter 5. To overcome this issue,
researchers could apply the Discounted Cash Flow method with more detail and
longer projection for each financial item examined.
Second, the key assumptions for the valuation could be reinforced by gathering more
cases and data and by drilling down in each financial item to obtain more detailed
performance measures. For example, the number of employees could be broken
down into the product of passenger-kilometer and the number of employees per
passenger-kilometer. In this way, cost items could be linked to the change in the
demand for the service (i.e., the service demand), and a more accurate financial
simulation could be conducted.
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Third, valuation analysis should be conducted in more detail for technical options (i.e.,
trade sale and IPO) of a PFP model because the sales price obtained from private
investors would be influenced by these options as well as the equity share retained by
the city.
Fourth, the financial and operational synergies should be quantified and reflected in
the valuation analysis. As stated earlier, there should be business synergies between
subway and bus systems. However, because of limited data availability, this research
could not quantify such synergies. In the extension of this research, the synergy
between the two businesses could be quantified by gathering more data and
incorporating it into the financial valuation model.
Finally and most importantly, the financial impact of the relinquishment of
governmental control over the privatized assets should be reflected in the valuation
model more explicitly and to allow quantification of the trade-off between financial
value and social risks.
Extend the valuation to other cases: In this research, the financial simulation
depends on the data of the Yokohama case primarily due to data availability.
Because major Japanese municipalities owning both subway and bus networks seem
to have a similar financial conditions to Yokohama, the result of valuation would
hypothetically not vary among them. However, to prove this hypothesis, a valuation
analysis with the same framework developed in this research should be conducted
for those major cities. Furthermore, this valuation analysis should be extended to
cases in other nations in order to test the validity of the framework and method and to
obtain more universal conclusions.
Identify the determinants and critical conditions for successful privatization:
Although this research did not analyze and identify the factors contributing to
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successful privatization of public transit systems, whether privatization can be
successful socially and financially is likely to be influenced by certain conditions. For
example, the question of why private transit operation can be a default managerial
option in Japan but not in the US or other developed nations is interesting and
important to defining the conditions or determinants of successful and sustainable
privatization. By answering this kind of question, further research could provide more
general policy guidance or implications for the municipalities outside Japan.
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APPENDIX A: VALUATION MODEL FOR YMSN
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VALUATION SIMULATION PANEL -YMSN
Model 1 1: Status-Quo (Public Ownership)
2: Concession
3: PFP
Scenario 1 1: BASE
2: Optimistic
3: Pessimistic
Tax rate 0% Scenario 1: No Tax; Scenario 2:Tax; Scenario 3: Tax
41 %D
WACC
Cash Flow Growth
Business Value
Direction of
Change
Change %
Before
After
Change
Change %
Before
After
Change
1:2.6%; 2:4.6%
Revenue
# of
Ridership( Ave. Fare
million) (JPY)
Operating
Cost
Ridership
Rev.
0% 0% 0%
171 175
175 1765
5 0
EBIT EBITDA
35% 11%
7,465 20,489
'10,087 22,721
2,622 2,232
29,998
29,998
0
FCF
35%
6,306
Advertising Subsidy
0% 0%
932 2,913
932 2,91 3
0 0
BVlness
35%
137,087
8538 185,598
2,232 48,511
CAPEX
# of Ave. Salary Labor Admin & Depreciati
Employee (JPY) Cost other on
20%
881
705
-176
5% 24%
11 9,298
10 7,066
-1 -2,232
0%.
4,056
4,056
0
3%
13,024
12,634
-390
Impact for the City Municipal PV of PV of Labor PV of
Tax Corporat cost Subsidy
e Tax shifted Red.
PV of Annual
Saved int. Contractor's
PMT net
)roceeds
0 00 0 0 0 0 1 N/A
* Annual Contractor's Net Proceeds=(1 +Required Contractor's EBIT margin)*(Total Operating Cost less Depreciation)-(Total Operating Cost less Depreciation)
Source: Annual Financial Report ("Kessan Houkoku-Syo") '03, '4, and '05 (YBT), Jack T.Nakajima
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PV OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATE TAX & SUBSIDY - YMSN
WACC 4,6%
Scenario I BASE
PV of Corporate TAX Concession
(Million JPY)
PFP
PV of Subsidy Public Ownership
(Million JPY)
Concession
PFP
Corporate tax 241 !!To be changed according to the change in "Valuation Simulation"
WACC 4.6%
Cash Flow Growth rate* 0.0%
PV of Tax for Yokohama" 5,242
* Assuming tax revenue is creased with same pace as Cash Flow Growth Rate
** On Average, 33% of Total Corporate Tax is counted as the tax revenue for a local government in Japan
Corporate tax 4,723 !To be changed according to the change in "Valuation Simulation"!!
WACC 4.6%
Cash Flow Growth rate* 0.0%
PV of Tax for Yokohlamia" 102,683
* Assuming tax revenue is creased with same pace as Cash Flow Growth Rate
** On Average, 33% of Total Corporate Tax is counted as the tax revenue for a local government in Japan
Subsidy ("Status Quo") 2,913
WACC 4.6%
PV of Subsidy
Subsidy (Privatized Operation)
WACC
PV of Subsidy
PV of Subsidy Reduction
Subsidy (Asset Transfer)
WACC
PV of Subsidy 0
PV of Subsidy Reduction 63,326
63,326
2,913 !!To be changed according to the change in "Valuation Simulation"!!
4.6%
63,326
0
0 !To be changed according to the change in "Valuation Simulation"!!
4.6%
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PV OF LABOR COST TRANSFERRED TO THE CITY - YMSN
(Million JPY)
Salary # of labor laid # of labor
off transferred
Public Ownership
Concession
PFP
PV of
labor
cost
transferr
ed
10 176 0 0
10 176 0 0
10 264 88 2,020
Public Ownership
Years until retirement 4
Wage Cut
Layoff (transfer tofthe city) 20% I
# of Labor Ave.Salary Labor Cost Change %
"Before"
After improvement
Impact
WACC
881 11 9,298 N/A
705 10 7,066 N/A
176
4.6%
Year 1 Year 2
# of transferred
Labor Cost
0.0 0.0
0 0
1 2,2321 -24%I
Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
0.0 0.0 0.0
0 0 0
Wage Cut
Layoff (transfer to the city) 20%
"Before"
Privatized Operation
Impact
# of Labor Ave.Salary Labor Cost Change %
881 11 9,298 N/A
705 10 7,066 N/A
176 1 2,2321 -24%
WACC 4.6%
Year 1 Year 2
# of transferred
Labor Cost
Year3 Year 4 Year 5
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0 0 0 0 0
lWage Cut 5
iLayoff (transfer to the city) 30%1
# of Labor Ave.Salary Labor Cost Change %
'Before"
Asset-transfer
Impact 264
WACC 4.6%
ofLakrcottransferedYe 2,21
Year I
# of transferred
Labor Cost
881 11 9,298 N/A
617 10 6,183 N/A
1 3,1151 -34%I
Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
44.1 22.0 0.0
442 221 0
Year 2
88.1 66.1
883 662
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PV OF INTEREST PAYMENT SAVING - YMSN
(Million JPY)
Residual Debt ('05) PED*
Special Debt **
Other debt***
Short-term Debt
Total
Interest Payment (05)
Interest Rate
Amount of Debt subject to interest saving****
Payback*****
Residual debt (E07)
PV of lit. Saving 17,577 "To be changed according to the business value"
*Public Enterprise Debt:"Ko-ei-Kigyo-sai"
**"Tokurei-sai"
***Short-term Debt + "Shihonhi-Futan Kanwabun Kigyo-sai"
****Assuming that the amount of debt equal to the amount of cash-in from the purchaser due to the asset sales is paid back to debt holders immediately
***** Assuming that the city of Yokohama would keep paying back the same amount of 2005
2007
Yr1
I
fit PMT
Amount of Debt subject to int saving
2008
Yr2
2
140,396
PV of Int. PMT
2009
Yr3
3
6,183
116,592
5,673
2010 2011 2012
Yr4 Yr5 Yr6
4 5 6
5,135 4,040 2,898 1,705
91,740 65,794 38,704 10,422
4,512 3,401 2,336 1,316
153
367,078
16,167
4.40%
140,396
29,97
307,104
2013
Yr7
7
459
-19,106
339
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FREE CASH FLOW SIMULATION -YMSN
Model 1 SQ
Scenario 1 BASE
Tax rate 0%
Million JPY
Revenue Ridership
(# of passengers: million)
(Ave. Fare)
Advertisement
Subsidy
Total Revenue
Costs Labor Cost
(Ave. Salary:million JPY)
(# of labors)
Other Operating Costs
Operating costs except Depreciation
Depreciation
Total Operating costs
Profit EBIT
EBITDA
Tax
Net Income
Net Income without subsidy
Working Capit, Short-term Assets less cash
Short-term liabilities less debts
Working Capital
Change in Working Capital
CAPEX Capital Expenditure
Changed %Change
29,998 0%
171 0%
175 0%
932 0%
2913 0%
33,843 0%
7,066 24%
10 5%
704.8 20%
4056 0%
11,122 17%
12633.7 3%
23,756 -10%
10,087 35%
22,721 11%
0 P #DIVf)!
10,087 35%
7,174 58%
N/A N/A
N/A N/A
N/A N/A
2,431 0%
11752 0%
Source: Annual Financial Report ( "Xesan iHbukoku-Syo ") '03, "04, and '05 (YTB), Jack T.Nakajima
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DEPRECIATION SIMULATION -YMSN
Depreciation Simulator
Scenario I BASE
Status-quo
Depreciation
CAPEX
PPE in End
Dep. Rate
Concession
Depreciation
CAPEX
PPE in End
Dep. Rate
PFP
Depreciation 13,024
CAPEX 11,752
PPE in End 517,531
Dep. Rate 3%
Change in CAPEX
0%
BASE Simulation
13,024 13,024 13,024 12,6341 3.0
11,752 11,752 0
517,531 434,554 421,530
3%
Change in CAPEX
0%
BASE Simulation
13,024 13,024 13,024 12,634 3.0%
11,752 11,752 0
517,531 434,554 421,530
3%
Change in CAPEX
10%
BASE Simulation
13,024
11,752
434,554
13,024
1,175
422,705
12,669 2.7%
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VALUATION SIMULATION PANEL -YMBS
Model
Scenario
1 1: Status-Quo (Public Ownership)
2: Concession
3: PFP
1 1: BASE
2: Optimistic
3: Pessimistic
0% Scenario 1: No Tax; Scenario 2:Tax; Scenario 3: Tax
41
Tax rate
WACC
Cash Flow Growth
Business Value
1:1.8%; 2:3.8%
ilion JPY Revenue
n f
Ridership( Ave. Fare Ridership Advertising
million) (JiY) Rev.
Subsidy
Operating
Cost
# of Ave. Salary Labor Admin & Depreciation
Employee (JPY) Cost other
0% 0% 0%
160 24,336 445
16O 24,336 445
0 0 0
EBITDA FCF BusinessValue
-13%
3,402
2,976
-426
-113%
376
-51
-426
-113%
9,882
1,330
-11,212
80%
2,503
501
-2,002
3%
2,422
2,349
-73
5% r
0
8%
20,081
18,505
-1,576
0%
3,801
3,801
0
4% 0%
2,293 1,796
2,210 1,796
-83 0
Municipal PV of PV of Labor
Tax Corporat cost
e Tax
PV of
Subsidy
Red.
PV of Annual
Saved hit Contractor's
PMT net
proceeds'
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N/A
* Annual Contractor's Net Proceeds=(1 +Required Contractor's EBIT margin)*(Total Operating Cost less Depreciation)-(Total Operating Cost less Depreciation)
Source: Annual Financial Report ('Kessan Houkoku-Syo") 3, '04, and '05 (YBT), Jack T.Nakajima
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Direction of
Change
Change %
Before
After
Change
Change %
Before
After
Change
CAPEX
EBIT
-31%
1,109
766
-343
Impact for the City PV of
annual
contractor'
s net
proceeds
Required
Contract
or's EBIT
Margin
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PV OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATE TAX & SUBSIDY - YMBS
WACC 3,8%
Scenario I BASE
PV of Corporate TAX Concession
(Million JPY)
PFP
Corporate tax 493
WACC 3.8%
Cash Flow Growth rate* 0.0%
PV of Tax for Yokohara" 12,982
* Assuming tax revenue is creased with same pace as Cash Flow Growth Rate
** On Average, 33% of Total Corporate Tax is counted as the tax revenue for a local government in Japan
Corporate tax 2,017 !To be changed according to the change in "Valuation Simulation" !!
WACC 3.8%
Cash Flow Growth rate* 0.0%PV of Tax for Yokohana," 53,091
* Assuming tax revenue is creased with same pace as Cash Flow Growth Rate
** On Average, 33% of Total Corporate Tax is counted as the tax revenue for a local government in Japan
PV of Subsidy
(Million JPY)
Public Ownership Subsidy ("Status Quo")
WACC
PV of Subsidy
Subsidy (Privatized Operation)
WACC
PV of Subsidy
PV of Subsidy Reduction
Subsidy (Asset Transfer)
WACC
PV of Subsidy
PV of Subsid Reduction
501 !To be changed according to the change in "Valuation Simulation"!!
3.8%
13,174
0
250 !!To be changed according to the change in "Valuation Simulation"!!
3.8%
6,587
6,587
158
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3.8%
13,174
Concession
PFP
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PV OF LABOR COST TRANSFERRED TO THE CITY - YMBS
(Million JPY)
Salary # of labor laid # of labor
off transferred
Status-quo
Privatized operation
Full Privatization
Public Ownership
T. Nakajima
PV of
labor cost
tranfered
0
0
1,329
Years until retirement 4
Wage Cut 5%
Layoff (transfer to the city) 3%
# of Labor Labor cost per Labor Cost
capita
"Before"
Privatized Operation
Impact
2,422
2,349
WACC 3.8%
V of'Labor cost transfer ed
Year I
# of transferred 0.0
Labor Cost 0
Change %
8 20,081 N/A
8 18.505 N/A
73 0 1,5761 -8%I
Year 2 Year3 Year 4 Year 5
Wage Cut 5%
Layoff (transfer to the city) 3%
# of Labor Labor cost per Labor Cost
capita
"Before"
Privatized Operation
Impact
WACC
2,422
2349
aPV oa os tr nsfrred 0
Year 1
#of transferred
Labor Cost
Change %
8 20,081 N/A
8 18.505 N/A
73 0 1,5761 -8%I
3.8%
Year 2 Year3 Year 4 Year 5
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0 0 0 0 0
Wage Cuit 1%
Layoff (transfer to the city) 6%
# of Labor Labor cost per Labor Cost
capita
2,422
2,277
Change %
8 20,081 N/A
7 16,989 N/A
3,092| -15%I
WACC 3.8%
PV of Labor cost transferred I 3
Year I
# of transferred
Labor Cost
Year 2 Year3 Year 4 Year 5
72.7 54.5 36.3 18.2 0.0
572 429 286 143 0
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Asset-transfer
Impact
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PV OF INTEREST PAYMENT SAVING - YMBS
(Million JPY)
Residual Debt ('05) PED*
Special Debt **
Other debt***
Short-term Debt
Total
Interest Payment (05)
Interest Rate
Amount of Debt subject to interest saving****
Payback*****
Residual debt (E07)
PV of Int. Saving
8,194
123
1.50%
8,194
1,1541
5,112
167
*Public Enterprise Debt:"Ko-ei-Kigyo-sai"
**"Tokurei-sai"
***Short-term Debt + "Shihonhi-Futan Kanwabun Kigyo-sai"
****Assuming that the amount of debt equal to the amount of cash-in from the purchacer due to the asset sales is paied back to debt hc
***** Assuming that the city of Yokohama would keep paying back the same amount of 2005
2007
Yr1
Int PMT
Amount of Debt subject to int saving
2008
Yr2
5,112
2009
Yr3
77
3,648
2010
Yr4
55
2,161
2011
Yr5
32
653
10
-878
PV of hit. PMT 52 31
160
Privatization of Transit in Yokohama
FREE CASH FLOW SIMULATION -YMBS
Model 1 SQ
Scenario 1 BASE
Tax rate 0%
Million JPY
Revenue Ridership
(# of Passengers)
(Ave. Fare)
Advertisement
Subsidy
Total Revenue
Costs Labor Cost
(Wage)
(# of labors)
Other operating costs
Operating costs except Depreciation
Depreciation
Total Operating costs
Profit EBIT
EBITDA
Tax
Net Income
Net Income without subsidy
Working Capita Short-term Assets less cash
Short-term liabilities less debts
Working Capital
Change in Working Capital
CAPEX Capital Expenditure
BASE Changed
24,336
152
160
6X 445
501
25,282
18,505
2,349
3,801
22,306
2,210
24,515
766
2,976
0
766
266
N/A
N/A
N/A
1,231
1,796
Source: Annual Financial Report ('Kessan Houkoku-Syo") 03, '04, and '05 (YTB), Jack T.Nakajima
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DEPRECIATION SIMULATION -YMBS
Scenario |
Status-quo
Depreciation
CAPEX
PPE in End
Dep Rate
Concession
Depreciation
CAPEX
PPE in End
Dep Rate
PFP
Depreciation
I | BASE I
Change in CAPEX
0%
FY2005 BASE Simulation
2,293 2,293 2,293 2,210 3.6%
3,079 1,796 1,796
13,662 13,662 13,165
17%1
Change in CAPEX
0%
FY2005 BASE Simulation
2,293 2,293 2,293 2,210j 3.6%j
3,079 1,796 1,796
13,662 13,662 13,165
17%
Change in CAPEX
10%
FY2005 BASE Simulation
2,293 2,293 2,293 2,179 5
CAPEX 3,079
PPE in End 13,662
Dep Rate 17%
1,796
13,662
1,616
12,965
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APPENDIX C: EARNING BEFORE INTEREST AND TAX (EBIT)
OF COMPARABLE COMPANIES
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EBIT Margin of The Four Comparable Railway Operators
Million JPY
Sales EBIT EBIT%
004
JR East 9020JP
Keihin Kyuko 9006JP
Sagami Tetsu 9003JP
Tokyu 9005JP
Average
Median
2005 Average
,592,393 2,564,940
311,961 314,314
304,584 307,106
,388,554 1,222,059
2004 2005 Average 2004 2005 Average
377,317
32,024
22,096
81,289
14.1%
9.7%
7.2%
7.3%
9.6% 9.8% 97%
8.5% 8.9% 8.7%
Source: Annual Financial Reports of Fiscal Year 2005, Jack T.Nakajima (2006)
EBIT Margin of Three Comparable Bus Operators
Million JPY
Sales EBIT
Kanachu
Niigata KotsI
Shinki Bus
Average
Median
9020JP
9006JP
9003JP
Average
136,246
28,699
37,074
Average 2004 2005 Average
7,305
1,644
1,775
5.6% 5.1% 5.4%
6.0% 5.5% 5.7%
5.3% 4.3% 4.8%
5.6% 4.9% 5.3%
5.6% 5.1% 5.4%
Source: Annual Financial Reports of Fiscal Year 2005, Jack T.Nakajima (2006)
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10.6%
7.2%
6.2%
14.7%
10.2%
7.2%
6.7%
EBIT%
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